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 When Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke visited Bears Ears National Monument in 
San Juan County, Utah, in May 2017, he was greeted by supporters whose baseball caps 
urged, “Make San Juan County Great Again.”1 The demonstrators meant that Secretary 
Zinke should advise President Trump to revise or revoke the protected status of the 1.35 
million acres of federal land that President Obama had designated a national monument in 
2016.2 In a now-familiar political tableau, the red-hats were met by counter-demonstrators 
supporting the monument: environmentalists, outdoor recreationists, and local indigenous 
groups. Among the counter-demonstrators were members of the Navajo Nation, who make 
up a slim majority of San Juan County’s population of 16,000 people, but have been 
restricted by gerrymandering to a permanent 2-1 minority position in an Anglo-dominated, 
county government that has consistently opposed the Obama monument and other federal 
land-protection measures by means extending to civil disobedience by elected officials. 
 
 About six months later, on December 4, 2017, President Trump issued a proclamation 
removing approximately 1.15 million acres (about 85 percent) of Bears Ears from monument 
status and separating the residual monument into two tracts. On the same day, Trump issued 
a second proclamation reducing the size of Utah’s Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument by 861,000 acres, leaving slightly over a million acres within the monument.3 
The two proclamations potentially opened substantial reserves of oil and gas, uranium, and 
coal to mining and drilling.4 Trump’s decision thrilled right-wing public-lands activists and 
their elected allies, who have long opposed federal land management as a usurpation of local 
control and denounced national monuments, in particular, as abuses of Presidential power. 
Environmental groups, Native tribes, and the Patagonia corporation, among others, filed suit 
in federal district court seeking to have the Trump proclamations declared illegal as ultra 
vires. 
 
 The courts are crowded with challenges to the Trump Administration’s environmental 
and public-lands policies, which represent, at the least, the biggest rollback of environmental 
                                                      
1 See Julie Turkewitz, Battle over Bears Ears Heats up as Trump Rethinks its Monument Status, N.Y. 
Times, May 14, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/14/us/bears-ears-ryan-zinke.html. 
2 See Coral Davenport, Obama Designates Two New National Monuments, Protecting 1.65 Million Acres, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/28/us/politics/obama-national-monument-
bears-ears-utah-gold-butte.html. 
3 See Presidential Proclamation Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument 
(Proclamation of President Trump), Dec. 4, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/presidential-proclamation-modifying-grand-staircase-escalante-national-monument/. 
4 See, e.g., Eric Lipton & Lisa Friedman, Oil Was Central to Shrink Bears Ears Monument, Emails Show, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 2018; Hiroki Tabuchi, Uranium Miners Pushed Hard for a Comeback. They Got 
Their Wish, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 2018 (on opening of potential uranium mining around Bears Ears); 
Brian Maffly, Oil and Coal Drove Trump’s Call to Shrink Bears Ears and Grand Staircase, According to 
Insider Emails Released by Court Order, Salt Lake Tribune, March 2, 2018. 
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protection since the first Reagan Administration.5 The dispute over the Trump monument 
proclamations stands out, however, from a field of litigation that will turn mainly on the 
adequacy of administrative procedure. The monuments proclamations present a question of 
judicial first impression concerning the major operational language of the Antiquities Act of 
1906. The Act, which was adopted in response to the looting of Native American sites on 
public lands, authorizes the President to create protected national monuments on federal 
lands simply by issuing a proclamation doing so.6 The Act makes no reference to the power 
that President Trump purported to exercise last December: to shrink or eliminate monuments 
declared by a predecessor. It is silent on how a national monument, once proclaimed, might 
be revised or revoked.7 
 
 The Administration has not yet fully articulated the legal theory of its proclamations in 
litigation, but its position is adumbrated in the arguments of its supporters, and in the limited 
set of clear paths indicated by the text and history of the Antiquities Act.8 The heart of the 
argument is that the power to revise or revoke monuments is implied in Congress’s 
delegating to the President the power “to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, 
historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest … to be 
national monuments.”9 The pro-Administration argument holds that the power to make law 
generally implies the power to revisit it, whether in withdrawing regulations, repealing 
legislation, or declaring an end to hostilities.10 The Administration’s interpretation of the 
Act finds some support in history: in the first fifty years of the Act’s existence, presidents 
made substantial revisions in national monuments, shrinking a few by tens or hundreds of 
thousands of acres and other (much smaller) ones by large fractions of their total area.11 
Surely, the argument goes, what the Act was long taken to authorize is good evidence of 
what it authorizes today. 
 
 On the other side, the core of the plaintiffs’ case against the Trump proclamations is a 
textual one: The Antiquities Act delegates the power that it names--to “declare” monuments-
                                                      
5 See, e.g., The E.P.A. Wasteland, Editorial, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1983 (“To see what has gone wrong 
inside the Environmental Protection Agency, there is no need to peer through the acrid vapors that stream 
from its every window…. Seldom since the emperor Caligula appointed his horse a consul has there been 
so wide a gulf between authority and competence.”); Howell Raines, Reagan Reversing Many U.S. 
Policies, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1981 (setting out Reagan Administration’s sweeping reversal of 
environmental enforcement policies). 
6 See 16 U.S.C. sec. 431. 
7 In this paper, I treat the kind of substantive revision that the Trump proclamations attempt as presenting 
the same interpretive question as an outright revocation. The scope of revision power that the Trump 
Administrations claims in its Bears Ears proclamation--cutting over eighty percent of the monument’s 
acreage and breaking it into two new monuments--suggests a power different only in form from the power 
of revocation. I do not intend any sleight-of-hand by this elision. 
8 See, e.g., Todd Gaziano & John Yoo, Presidential Power to Revoke or Reduce National Monument 
Designations, forthcoming, 35 Yale J. Reg. (2018) (SSRN version last updated Aug. 15, 2017). 
9 See 16 U.S.C. sec. 431. 
10 See Gaziano & Yoo, supra n. __ at 2, 14-18 (arguing that “a general discretionary revocation power 
must exist”). 
11 See infra nn. __ - __ and accompanying text. 
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-and no more.12 Congress knew how to grant a two-way power to withdraw or reserve lands 
reversibly, and did so explicitly in major public-lands statutes from the same period. The 
Forest Service Organic Act of 1897 authorized the President to “revoke, modify, or suspend” 
the national-forest status of public lands.13 The General Withdrawal Act of 1910 (Pickett 
Act) authorized the President to make “temporary withdrawals” of public land, which, by 
the statute’s terms, remained in effect until revoked by the President or by Congress.14 
 
Opponents of the withdrawals also advance several secondary arguments. They point 
out that the history of early Presidential monument revisions is somewhat offset by a 1938 
opinion of the Attorney General concluding that the President may not revoke monuments.15 
They lean on language in the House Report accompanying the Federal Lands Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which describes the Act as “specifically reserv[ing] to 
the Congress the authority to modify and revoke withdrawals for national monuments 
created under the Antiquities Act.”16 And they argue that allowing the President to revoke 
or substantially revise monuments would undermine the Antiquities Act’s purpose of 
permanent protection, which legislative history arguably evinces.17 
 
All the secondary arguments against the Trump proclamations are vexed. The 1938 
Attorney General’s opinion rejecting the Presidential power to revoke monuments 
acknowledged and did not repudiate substantial prior Presidential revisions of monuments. 
FLPMA’s House Report does not match the text of FLPMA as adopted, which rather 
puzzlingly prohibited the Secretary of the Interior from modifying or revoking monument 
proclamations, with no mention of the President.18 (The Antiquities Act makes no reference 
to any delegation of power over national monuments to the Secretary.) And the invocation 
of the Antiquities Act’s purpose begs the question of which powers Congress delegated. No 
one doubts that Congress can reverse even the most protective reservations of public lands 
by repealing legislation that designates a wilderness area or establishes a national park.19 
Nothing in the super-protective purpose of these original designations prevents their later 
                                                      
12 See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Case 1:17-cv-
02591-TSC, Doc. 21-1 (Jan. 20, 2018) at 24-26 (advancing this plain-language argument); Mark 
Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas Bryner, & Sean Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or 
Diminish National Monuments, 103 Va. L. Rev. Online 55, 57-59 (so arguing). 
13 Pub. L. No. 2 (1897). [Note it is presented as being to resolve any doubts.] First delegated in the 
General Revision Act of 1891, the Presidential power to establish national forests by proclamation had, 
by 1909, been used to designate more than 194 million acres as national forest. See Paul W. Gates, 
History of Public Land Law Development 580 (1968). 
14 36 Stat. 847 (1910). The Pickett Act’s withdrawal power was repealed, along with most other 
executive-branch powers of withdrawal and reservation, with the passage of the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976. 
15 See Plaintiffs’ Motion at 38-40 (so arguing); Squillace et al. at 65-66; Proposed Abolishment of Castle 
Pinckney National Monument, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 185, 188 (1938). 
16 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1163, at 9 (May 15, 1976); Squillace et al. at 59-64. 
17 See Plaintiffs’ Brief at 26-28 (so arguing). 
18 See 43 U.S.C. sec. 1714(j) (“The Secretary shall not … modify or revoke any withdrawal creating 
national monuments under [the Antiquities Act.]”). 
19 See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. sec. 1131 et seq. (creating framework for establishing 
wilderness by subsequent legislation); Act of March 1, 1872 (establishing Yellowstone National Park). 
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reversal. To make the plaintiffs’ argument here, one would need an account of why Congress 
should be taken to have delegated its protective power but not its power to reverse protective 
designations. 
 
The common limitation of all these arguments is their indifference to the larger structure 
of public-lands law in which the Antiquities Act operates. The Administration’s case that 
the Antiquities Act’s proclamation power should be presumed to be reversible takes its 
plausibility from its serene generality, lacking any public-lands application or example. But 
the opponents’ argument also falls short of its potential by concentrating on the Act’s text 
and history to the exclusion of the field of public-lands law in which it works. Public-lands 
law has a normative structure that is highly relevant in determining whether the Trump 
proclamations are ultra vires. It has developed over decades a strong premise of an 
asymmetric Presidential power, a preference for Presidential decisions that bring public land 
within protected categories, and a corresponding wariness of Presidential actions that 
unilaterally make formerly protected lands available for drilling, mining, and other 
privatizing regimes. This asymmetric premise reflects the structured normative pluralism of 
the field--put more plainly, the way it integrates competing purposes and management 
regimes from a centuries-long series of statutes into a relatively coherent system of 
governance. 
 
Once lands are placed in specially protected categories such as monument status, the 
very strong pattern across public-lands law is that only Congress, not the President, may act 
to open them to extractive privatization.20 This pattern has developed for three reasons: a 
worry about precipitate Executive privatization and the possibility of inappropriate motives 
for such action, a worry sometimes described as corruption; a recognition that extractive 
uses of land, once authorized, may destroy the land’s unique value (scientific, historical, or 
scenic) and effectively pre-empt Congress’s decision whether to preserve that value; and a 
general policy since FLPMA’s adoption in 1976 of concentrating control of public-lands 
classification in Congress, with the sole exception of the Antiquities Act. While the Act is 
something of an anomaly in public-lands law in its authorization of unilateral Presidential 
protection of public lands, interpreting it to authorize the President unilaterally to strip lands 
of protection would create a much greater anomaly. 
 
Each of the opponents’ secondary arguments against the Trump proclamations gains 
force once it is set in this account of public-lands law. Early opinions of the Attorney General 
articulate the anti-corruption rationale for the asymmetric premise against Presidential 
                                                      
20 Throughout this paper, I use privatization to refer to the creation of vested private claims on public-
lands resources, whether through the traditional means of transferring acreage (with or without mineral or 
water rights) as real estate, or through today’s regimes authorizing mining, drilling, and timbering. I 
sometimes refer to the latter as “extractive privatization,” and use “extractivism” to refer to the political 
position that both advances extractive interests and links them to accounts of national interest or 
collective identity. My reason for linking rather different regimes under the “privatization” rubric is that 
they have presented the same core dangers in public-lands law all along, the risk that precipitate or 
opportunistic Executive-branch transfer of public resources will irreversibly compromise competing 
values and pre-empt Congress’s ultimate authority in governing public lands. For this reason, they play a 
unified structural role in public-lands law. 
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privatization. The protective purpose of the Antiquities Act does not itself show that the 
President cannot strip protected status from national monuments, but it does fit monuments 
within the field’s general reasons for the premise that the President may not unilaterally open 
lands to extractive privatization. And FLPMA is key to assessing the legality of the Trump 
proclamations, but not because it provides a specific ban on Presidential reclassification. 
Rather, FLPMA provides a key stage in the development of the relationship between 
Presidential and Congressional reclassification of public lands in the twentieth century. 
Understood in their legal and historical contexts, the Presidential revisions of monuments in 
the first fifty years of the Act’s existence can all be understood as justified on public-lands 
powers other than the Antiquities Act. None of those powers, however, rested on repudiation 
of the asymmetric premise against Presidential privatization. Moreover, FLPMA repealed 
the statutory and doctrinal bases of those powers, leaving the Antiquities Act without 
supplement from other Presidential power. The key thing about FLPMA is not that it forbade 
Executive revision or revocation of national monuments, but that it erased the legal 
landscape on which those actions were once plausible. 
 
A general account of public-lands law has another benefit. It turns out to make space 
for themes that are vividly present in the Trump proclamations, but which the arguments 
now on public offer do not find ways to incorporate. As noted earlier, it is widely recognized 
that the Trump proclamations open the Utah monuments to mining and drilling, and media 
coverage assumes that this fact bears on the appropriateness of the proclamations. 
Nonetheless, the entanglement of the Administration’s monuments decisions with extractive 
interests has not made its way into the legal analysis of the case. Yet it is precisely this sort 
of precipitate and controversially motivated permission for extractive privatization that 
grounds the asymmetric premise in Presidential power over public lands. Critics’ focus on 
this issue reflects an inchoate normative idea about public-lands governance that, in fact, has 
footing in the field, once we can see it. 
 
An account of public-lands law also shows the relevance of the culture-wars elements 
of the Trump proclamations, the right-wing strand of localism that the Administration 
catered to in its monument decisions. It is hard, in this time of rising dissension and resurgent 
white nationalism, not to feel it must matter that the Bundy family, an iconic clan of anti-
government activists with white-nationalist affiliations, has a hand in the grass-roots 
pressure to strip protection from the Utah monuments. These considerations might, 
nonetheless, seem to fall outside the properly legal concerns of the Antiquities Act. On the 
contrary, however, the public-lands populists’ insistence on the priority of private and 
extractive claims on public resources is not new to public-lands law. It is a recasting of the 
ideological basis of a major strand of the field, the program of privatization and extraction 
that, coupled with settler-colonial politics, dominated the governance of public lands for its 
first century, and continues to play an important role within it. While there is much in this 
public-lands populism to resist and oppose, for purposes of this analysis the proper response 
is to recognize its legal familiarity. Extractivism as a political and cultural agenda has a place 
within the structure of public-lands law, a place that is cabined by the premise against 
Presidential privatization. From the point of view of public-lands law, the public-lands 
  WHOSE LANDS? WHICH PUBLIC? 
 
7 
populists present a reminder that this fight over whose public lands these are, and who counts 
as “the public” in this field, is internal to this body of law.21  
 
 The need for judicial interpretation of the Antiquities Act after 112 years highlights 
another need: for a general account of the body of public-lands law that houses the Act. The 
law of federal public lands governs nearly thirty percent of the country’s land area, including 
vast mineral and timber wealth and iconic scenic and recreational sites, and implicates 
divisive environmental questions from the governance of mining to the protection of 
endangered species.22 Formed from a palimpsest of statutes adopted between 1785 and 1976, 
it integrates competing public purposes across deep conflicts over both the value of the 
natural world and the makeup of “the public” itself. Within an enriched account of the 
historical development and normative structure of public-lands law, the Trump 
proclamations cease to seem a plausibly close question and instead emerge as an effort to 
rework the field in radical ways. Aspects of the Trump proclamations that might at first seem 
of only political or even narrative interest, such as their catering to extractive interests and 
their participation in the culture wars around Western public lands, turn out to help show 
why the proclamations should be held illegal.    
   
 In Part I of what follows, I outline the creation and putative revision of the Bears Ears 
and Grand Staircase-Escalante national monuments. I argue that the Trump proclamations 
do not support the Administration’s presentation of its revisions as merely implementing the 
Antiquities Act’s requirement that monuments occupy the smallest area compatible with 
protection of the designated objects. Rather, the proclamations revisit and revise the 
substantive scope of the monuments’ protective purposes, and arguably even presuppose a 
drastic narrowing of the scope of values eligible for protection under the Act. The Trump 
proclamations thus squarely raise the question of the President’s power to revise monuments 
substantially. In Part II, I describe the Trump proclamation’ debt to public-lands populism 
and outline the ideological field, network of activists and public officials, and vision of “the 
public” that together generate this program for public lands and create its affinities with 
President Trump’s nationalism. In Part III, I turn to the question of how to interpret the 
Antiquities Act. After surveying the arguments that have emerged in the current dispute, I 
propose a framework for understanding public-lands law and locating the question of the 
President’s proclamation power within it. The field displays a structured normative 
pluralism, integrating competing public-lands goals in definite patterns that enable their 
coexistence across uses ranging from mining to wilderness preservation. Once public 
resources are subjected to vested private claims--a reclassification I call privatization 
whether or not it permanently converts federal land into private real estate--these claims 
survive and are immune to later reclassification. When, however, land is reclassified into a 
categorically protected status, such as a national park, wilderness, or wilderness study area, 
                                                      
21 In saying this, I don’t mean to normalize the white-nationalist affiliations of certain public-lands 
activism, nor to set aside the gerrymandering of San Juan County’s Navajo population, both of which I 
return to later in the paper. Here, in a mode of governance that engages these issues only obliquely, 
public-lands law takes account of the presence of extractivist activists in political decisions while 
establishing reasons that their agenda should not prevail in this dispute. 
22 See generally Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (1968) (far-ranging account of 
the origin, scope, and structure of the public lands and the legal regimes governing them). 
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only Congress may re-open it to eligibility for new private claims. Finding that the President 
can reclassify monuments to open them to new private claims would make the Antiquities 
Act a dramatic departure from the way that public-lands law generally integrates the 
competing values that bear on public lands. In Part IV, I set out a further and long-standing 
reason for this structure of public-lands powers: preventing precipitate and potentially 
opportunistic Presidential opening of public resources to favored constituents--in a word, 
corruption, which is especially troubling when its effect on protected lands would be 
irreversible. I argue that this rationale applies to the Antiquities Act and helps to explain the 
Act’s delegation of a one-way power to proclaim monuments, but not to revoke or revise 
them. In Part V, I turn to the early Presidential monument revisions and show that they took 
place against a background of expansive claims of Presidential power to reclassify federal 
land--a power generally articulated and exercised in ways that acknowledged the 
presumption against Presidential privatization, but which otherwise pushed Executive 
control over public lands to its limit and perhaps beyond. That claimed power accounts for 
the plausibility of most of the early revisions in their times. They would not be plausible 
today as exercises of the delegated power of the Antiquities Act. In Part VI, I briefly recap 
and conclude. 
 
I. A. THE ANTIQUITIES ACT AND THE TRUMP PROCLAMATIONS 
The President’s power to create national monuments arises under the Antiquities Act of 
1906, which provides,  
 
That the President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to 
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric 
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon 
the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national 
monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which 
in all cases shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care 
and management of the objects to be protected.23 
 
National monuments comprise over 15 million predominantly inland or coastal acres 
(including the contested portions of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante), with most 
of the land area in the mountain West and Alaska, as well as more than 750 million chiefly 
marine acres.24 Monuments range from White Sands and portions of the Grand Canyon and 
the Marianas Trench (including the deepest point in the world’s oceans) to the Pullman 
factory, site of the iconic 1894 strike, and Stonewall, honoring the watershed “riot” against 
anti-gay police harassment in Manhattan’s West Village.25 Many early national monuments 
later became national parks, and most current monuments are administered by the National 
Parks Service, although some are entrusted to the Forest Service, the Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Oceans and Atmospherics 
                                                      
23 16 U.S.C. sec. 431 
24 See https://www.nps.gov/archeology/sites/antiquities/monumentslist.htm (National Park Service 
inventory of national monuments in order of their dates of creation and size, noting which agencies are 
responsible for their administration and which have been converted to national parks or otherwise 
reclassified). 
25 See id. 
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Administration.26 Although Presidents enjoy considerable discretion in prescribing the 
management of the monuments they designate, monument status has typically entailed 
withdrawal from the various privatization schemes that operate by default on public lands, 
making them eligible for conversion to private real estate (before most such regimes were 
suspended in 1934, then repealed in 1976) or mining, drilling, and timbering. 
 
 A. Bears Ears and Grand Staircase-Escalante 
President Obama’s 2016 Bears Ears proclamation withdrew the newly designated 
monument from eligibility for timber sales, oil and gas leases, and mining, along with other 
federal schemes for private extraction from the public lands.27 The proclamation also 
directed the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management to govern the Monument 
in consultation with a pair of advisory committees, one drawn from a set of “local 
stakeholders” including government officials, landowners, recreational users of the region, 
business owners, and tribes, the other composed entirely of members of local tribes: the Hopi 
and Navajo nations, two tribes of the Ute people, and the Zuni tribe.28 The monument 
designation thus entailed both substantive changes in land use, particularly limits on 
extraction, and procedural changes in governance of the region. 
 
 President Trump’s 2017 proclamation, purporting to remove 1.15 million acres of Bears 
Ears from monument status and separate the residual monument into two tracts, also 
restricted the formal input of the local tribal commission to one of the two tracts, re-opened 
the 1.15 million acres to various federal extraction regimes, and made the residual monument 
subject to private grazing rights. 29  As described in the Introduction, Trump’s simultaneous 
proclamation reduced the size of Utah’s Clinton-era Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument by 861,000 acres, leaving slightly over a million acres in the monument.30 The 
proclamations arose from a review that began in April 2017, when Trump issued an 
executive order directing Secretary Zinke to review major monument designations made 
since 1996, with attention to their compatibility with the act’s scope (protecting “objects of 
historic or scientific interest” within “the smallest area compatible” with their protection) 
and to “concerns of state, tribal, and local governments … including [their] economic 
development and fiscal condition.”31 
 
                                                      
26 See id. 
27 See Presidential Proclamation 9558--Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument 
(Proclamation of Pres. Obama), Dec. 28, 2018, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/12/28/proclamation-establishment-bears-ears-national-monument 
28 See id. In using the term “nation” and the more archaic and controversial “tribe,” I am following the 
language of the proclamation, which was developed in close consultation with representatives of local 
indigenous populations. 
29 See Presidential Proclamation Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument (Proclamation of 
President Trump), Dec. 4, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-
proclamation-modifying-bears-ears-national-monument/. 
30 See Presidential Proclamation Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument 
(Proclamation of President Trump), Dec. 4, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/presidential-proclamation-modifying-grand-staircase-escalante-national-monument/. 
31 Presidential Executive Order on the Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act (Executive 
Order No. 13792, April 26, 2017).   
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The memorandum that Secretary Zinke produced in response, after criticizing the 
breadth of “landscape area designation” of protected objects in the Clinton and Obama 
proclamations, charged these monument reservations with economic harm to local 
communities that depend on “grazing, timber production, mining,” and other land uses that 
monument proclamations tend to restrict.32 The memorandum emphasized that, “Local 
governments raised issues relating to lost jobs and revenue” arising from “the limitations 
placed on land development … especially when there has been a lack of meaningful 
consultation and public process before monuments are designated.”33 The recommendations 
underlying the Trump proclamations thus directed attention to a set of economic and 
procedural questions that form no part of the Antiquities Act’s requirements or even its scope 
of concern, but which matter a great deal to certain Western constituencies. 
  
B. The Scope of the Trump Proclamations 
The Trump proclamations present themselves as implementing the Antiquities Act by 
enforcing its requirement that monuments include only “the smallest area” compatible with 
the preservation of protected “objects of historic or scientific interest.” If this were correct, 
the Trump proclamations might not raise the question whether the President can substantially 
revise or revoke earlier monument designations. They might be justified on a narrower 
power to adjust the implementation of earlier proclamations without revisiting their 
substantive judgments. The issue of the President’s power to revise or revoke monuments 
would still be interesting and important, but it would not be squarely presented in the Trump 
proclamations. 
 
The Trump Administration’s characterization of its proclamations, however, is not 
plausible. They sweep further than that, excluding substantial categories of protected objects 
from the earlier proclamations. Read in conjunction with Secretary Zinke’s underlying 
memo, they even suggest a reinterpretation of the Antiquities Act itself to restrict its scope 
of authorized protection to a narrow version of “objects of … scientific interest,” excluding 
much of what monuments protect. Either way, the proclamations are not a ministerial 
correction within the terms of the earlier proclamations that established the monuments. 
They can stand only if the President enjoys a full-dress power under the Act to revise or 
revoke earlier monuments. 
 
There is no disputing that an “object of scientific interest” under the Antiquities Act 
may be a landscape-scale phenomenon. After 1906, presidents immediately began to treat 
the Act’s “smallest area” requirement as compatible with landscape-scale monument 
proclamations, including President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908 creation of the Grand 
Canyon National Monument (more than 800,000 acres) and 1909 proclamation of Mount 
Olympus National Monument (over 600,000 acres).34 The Grand Canyon reservation was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1920, and since then presidential discretion to designate 
landscape-scale areas as national monuments has been consistently accepted against 
                                                      
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 8. 
34 Presidential Proclamation of Jan. 11, 1908, 34 Stat. 225 (Grand Canyon); Presidential Proclamation of 
March 2, 1909, No. 869, 35 Stat. 2247 (Mount Olympus). 
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occasional legal challenges.35 The  Court rejected the argument that “there was no authority 
for [the] creation” of the first Grand Canyon National Monument under the Act, explaining 
that the canyon was eligible for monument status because, “It … affords an unexampled 
field for geologic study [and] is regarded as one of the great natural wonders.”36 This 
embrace of a very broad spatial interpretation of the Act’s requirement that monuments be 
confined to the “smallest area” keys that language to the geological and scenic conceptions 
of early twentieth century preservation. So interpreted, the “smallest area” may be enormous, 
so long as it corresponds to a qualifying “object of scientific interest.” A monument’s 
permissible size is a function of the size of the object it protects. The “smallest area” 
requirement implies no restriction of the statute’s protection to small objects. This much is 
long settled. 
 
The Trump proclamations raise the question of what scope of “scientific interest” can 
anchor landscape-scale preservation. President Obama’s proclamation creating the Bears 
Ears monument spends eight rather fulsome paragraphs describing the area’s “diversity of 
… soils and microenvironments,” its many plants (inter alia, low sage, winterfat, cliff rose, 
greasewood, common mallow, low larkspur, needle and thread, the Kachina daisy, sand 
verbena, the straight bladderpod, and Durango tumble mustard) and animals (ferruginous 
hawk, flammulated owl, pallid bat, side-blotched lizard, bobcats and “the occasional 
mountain lion”), as well as the role of distinctive riparian and mesa settings in assembling 
these ecological “communities.”37  
 
The Trump proclamations appear to construe the Antiquities Act as excluding 
ecological objects from monument protection. The proclamations shrinking Bear Ears and 
Grand Staircase-Escalante both argue that the original designations exceeded the Act’s 
“smallest area” requirement by reserving more land than was necessary to protect the core 
geological and archaeological features of the sites.38 President Trump’s Bears Ears 
proclamation devotes all but two sentences of its discussion of qualifying objects to 
archaeological and dramatic geological features of the monument, the exception being a set 
of mesa plant communities that the proclamation identifies as unique to the site.39 Much of 
the ecological basis of the Obama declaration appears to fall by implication under the Trump 
proclamation’s announcement that, “Some of the objects Proclamation 9558 identifies are 
not unique to the monument, and some of the particular examples of these objects within the 
monument are not of significant scientific or historic interest.”40 The Trump proclamation 
continues, “Moreover, many of the objects Proclamation 9558 identifies were not under 
                                                      
35 See Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); Tulare County v. Bush 306 F.3d 1138 (2002) 
(affirming broad scope of Presidential discretion, including eligibility of ecosystems for protection).  
36 Id. 
37 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=119941 
38 See supra n. __ [and passages therein]. 
39 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-modifying-bears-ears-
national-monument/ (“The Indian Creek area [one of the two remnant monuments left by the Trump 
proclamation] also includes 2 prominent mesas … which are home to relict plant communities … that 
exist only on these isolated islands in the desert sea and are, generally, unaltered by humans.”) 
40 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-proclamation-modifying-bears-ears-
national-monument/  
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threat of damage or destruction before designation such that they required a reservation of 
land to protect them.”41 (There is no statutory requirement that Antiquities Act 
proclamations identify objects that are “under threat of damage or destruction.”) The 
Administration’s view of the Act appears to be that qualifying objects do not include 
ecosystems, plant communities, etc., except where these are unique or hold extraordinary 
scientific interest for some other reason.  
 
Similarly, President Clinton’s proclamation of the Grand Staircase-Escalante monument 
devoted one of five paragraphs (and about a third of its total words) to describing among its 
qualifying objects  the area’s varied “life zones” of soils, flora, and fauna.42 President 
Trump’s proclamation purporting to shrink the monument in pursuit of the “smallest area” 
requirement makes no reference to ecology or biodiversity, instead devoting its discussion 
of qualifying objects (fourteen paragraphs, though not much longer in sum than the Clinton 
proclamation) to geological, paleontological, archaeological, and historical features of the 
area.43 The Trump proclamation does note the prior proclamation’s attention to “animal and 
plant species” and observe that the “revised boundaries contain the majority of the habitat 
types originally protected,” but gives no indication that it regards this partial continued 
protection as legally obligatory, and indeed appears to claim that these are, by and large, not 
qualifying objects, being neither unique nor “under threat or damage or destruction.”44 
 
The Trump proclamations, then, implicitly propose a reinterpretation of the Antiquities 
Act. They recast the definition of objects qualifying for protection, returning to a historical 
core of geological and archaeological objects, restricting current plant and animal 
communities to those that are unique to the protected site, and adding (at least in some 
applications) a requirement that protected objects be under threat of damage or destruction. 
This direction is signaled in Secretary Zinke’s memorandum proposing the revisions, in 
which he criticizes prior proclamations for protecting “objects not clearly defined,” such as 
“geographic areas including viewsheds and ecosystems.”45 Zinke also described recent 
constructions of the Act’s “object” and “smallest area” requirements as “either arbitrary or 
likely politically motivated” and complained that the resulting monuments’ “boundaries 
could not be supported by science or reasons of practical resource management.”46 
 
 Maybe this is an over-reading, and the Trump proclamations do not presuppose what 
the Zinke memo suggests, that the Antiquities Act requires their restriction in the field of 
protected objects. Maybe the President simply took it on himself to exclude a great deal of 
what the Clinton proclamation and, especially, the Obama proclamation designated as 
protected objects. If that is the case, the new monument boundaries, especially in Bears Ears, 
do not plausibly delimit the “smallest area” necessary to protect the objects that President 







45 Zinke memorandum, p. 7. 
46 Id. at 2. 
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Obama designated as of scientific or historic interest. They delimit an area fitted to a new set 
of protected objects, one substantially smaller and qualitatively different from Obama’s. 
 
There is no good reason to accept that President Trump’s monument reductions are, as 
the Administration contends, adjustments of the monuments’ sizes to the “smallest area” that 
preserves their protected objects. The reductions are, rather, a substantive revisiting of which 
objects within the monuments deserve or are eligible for protection.47 They can be justified 
only by a full-dress power to revise or revoke earlier monument proclamations. 
 
I next turn in Part II to the political context and ideological drivers of the Trump 
proclamations before engaging, in Part III and thereafter, the question of how best to 
interpret the Antiquities Act. 
 
II. THE TRUMP PROCLAMATIONS AND PUBLIC-LANDS POPULISM 
The shift in statutory interpretation signals the elevation of a specific set of local 
extractive and other traditional land uses in public-land law. As noted a bit earlier, the Trump 
executive order and resulting Zinke memorandum, which together underlie the Trump 
proclamations, emphasize the effects of monuments on local economies and the level of 
local feedback and support for monument designations.  What is striking is the 
memorandum’s premise that these concerns, which do not figure in the Act itself, should 
carry special weight in its implementation. The Zinke memorandum takes a particularly 
sharp tone of advocacy. Zinke observes that, although the monument designations under 
review were sometimes preceded by public meetings, “these meetings were not always 
adequately noticed to all stakeholders and instead were filled with advocates organized by 
non-governmental organizations to promote monument designations. (It is worth noting that 
this dynamic is similarly reflected in the public comment process for this review.)” 48 The 
memorandum goes out of its way to rebut the putatively pre-programmed views of 
monument supporters, asserting that their view that “monument designation [can] prevent 
the sale or transfer of public land … is false and has no basis in fact,” while faithfully 
transmitting the views of monument opponents, “often local residents,” whose concerns 
were unfortunately swamped by “a well-orchestrated national campaign organized by 
multiple organizations.”49 
 
So the Zinke memorandum and the Trump proclamations are pieces of advocacy. So 
what? After all, the Clinton and Obama proclamations are somewhat more elegantly crafted 
pieces of advocacy for their monument designations. The point is that the Trump 
Administration’s advocacy, particularly that of the Zinke memorandum, ties a narrowed 
interpretation of the Antiquities Act’s scope to a particular conception of whose views count 
with respect to these public lands--who forms the relevant public. The memo presents 
previous administrations’ decisions as legally erroneous and in bad faith (“arbitrary or likely 
                                                      
47 Because the Trump proclamations do not argue in as many words that ecological reservation falls 
outside the text of the Antiquities Act, it may be more accurate to say that the proclamations reclassify the 
monuments’ ecological features as undeserving of protection, though the more ambitious interpretation 
lurks in the background. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 2-3. 
  WHOSE LANDS? WHICH PUBLIC? 
 
14 
politically motivated”), and in the service of an environmentalist constituency that lacks the 
right sort of concrete attachment to the place. The memorandum suggests, though it does not 
actually argue, that local communities (characterized as extractive or other traditional 
economic resource users) should retain a veto over landscape-scale designations: “Despite 
the apparent lack of adherence to the purpose of the Act, some monuments reflect a long 
public debate process and are largely settled and strongly supported by the local community. 
Other monuments remain controversial…”50 The implication appears to be that landscape-
scale monuments that “remain controversial” with the appropriately defined local 
community must lack a proper basis in either statutory authorization or political legitimacy, 
and should be returned to the “vigorous public balancing processes” of multi-use planning 
that leave more room for economic uses of public lands.51 The pieces of this argument 
interlock: the Act is interpreted in a fashion that limits the President’s authority to protect 
ecological values by limiting extractive uses of public lands. In turn, an interest in extractive 
uses helps to define which local land users count as the “public” in the Administration’s 
account. And that public, in turn, occupies a privileged place in determining the validity of 
monument designations, not just in the initial process, but thereafter, with its current support 
or opposition key to assessing a prior monument proclamation. 
 
A. Public-Lands Populism and Extractivist Nationalism 
While issuing his proclamations in Salt Lake City, Utah, President Trump delivered a 
brief address on control of federal public lands. He denounced “abuses of the Antiquities 
Act [that] give enormous power to faraway bureaucrats at the expense of the people who 
actually live here, work here, and make this place their home … where they raise their 
children … the place they love.”52 The Obama and Clinton monuments, he said, had brought 
“harmful and unnecessary restrictions on hunting, ranching, and responsible economic 
development,” preventing ranching families from “passing on their businesses and beloved 
heritage to the children.”53 Trump continued, “These abuses of the Antiquities Act have not 
just threatened your local economies; they’ve threatened your way of life. They’ve 
threatened your hearts.”54 Future land management, he promised, would “give back your 
voice,” prioritize “the local communities that knows [sic] the land the best and that cherishes 
the land the most,” and make public land open “to public use.”55  
 
 Trump’s remarks highlight a key aspect of his monument proclamations: the embrace 
and elevation of a long-running strand of Western politics. This politics, which I will call 
public-lands populism, contests the question of whose lands the federal public lands should 
be--that is, whether they should be federally administered, transferred to state and local 
control, or privatized. Like all populism, it also contests the question of just who count as 
part of “the public.” Its answers have consistently favored state and local control; extractive 
policies such as mining, drilling, and timbering; and political, material, and symbolic 
                                                      
50 Id. at 2. 
51 Id. at 8. 
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primacy for local landholders and employees in the extractive industries, who figure in this 
populist “public” as hardworking, upright, and white. These positions align with the interests 
of the mining, drilling, and timbering industries, although these enterprises are invisible in 
the imagery of public-lands populism, except when they touch down as “work” or “economic 
development.” This set of views has circulated for decades in rural and activist networks and 
finds more formal development in intermittent litigation by local governments and property-
rights organizations such as the Pacific Legal Foundation.56 
 
In elevating these themes, Trump moved to incorporate public-lands populism into the 
larger themes of his administration’s recasting of nationalism. 57 Trumpist nationalism has 
an economic dimension, which often finds expression in a neo-mercantilist rhetoric (and, at 
the time of writing, increasingly aggressive) policy of zero-sum competition among national 
economies. This orientation has resonated in environmental and natural-resources law with 
the administration’s embrace of “energy dominance” as the slogan for its program of 
offshore oil-drilling and other regulatory moves toward cheaper and faster extraction of 
fossil fuels.58 The domestic face of economic nationalism has been a politicization of 
economic and environmental policy to support a favored set of traditionally blue-collar 
extractive and manufacturing industries, perhaps most saliently Appalachian coal-mining.59 
 
Trump’s nationalism is deservedly notorious for its ethno-cultural dimension, which has 
increased the political salience of immigration, race, and religion, in the course of tying 
renewed American “greatness” to nativism, whiteness, and the putative superior dignity of 
certain kinds of manual and mechanical labor.60 Extractive labor and other traditional 
resource uses are a meeting-place of the ethno-cultural dimensions of Trumpist politics with 
its orientation to “energy dominance.” A right-wing politics of recognition has crystallized 
around some of the industries and types of work that are most closely implicated in public-
lands and environmental policymaking. These themes were deliberately personified in the 
                                                      
56 https://pacificlegal.org/plf-urges-administration-reverse-antiquities-act-abuses/ 
57 In my discussion of Trump’s nationalism, I am influenced by Jan-Werner Muller’s formulation of 
“populism,” which escapes various fuzzy tropes (anti-elitism, etc.) to home in on a form of political 
appear that identifies the normative character of the nation, the “true” nation, with a sub-set of the actual 
population, thus making possible various antidemocratic, majority-trumping or illiberal, minority-
subordinating moves on behalf of the “true” people. See Jan-Werner Muller, What Is Populism? (2016). A 
characterization of how one qualifies as a member of that elect is thus essential; public-lands populism 
trades on such an account, emphasizing the local, rural, hardworking/extractive, and implicitly or 
explicitly Anglo character of its actual and ideal constituencies. 
58 See Lisa Friedman, Trump Moves to Open Nearly All Offshore Waters to Drilling, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 
2018 (detailing offshort drilling announcement and quoting Interior Secretary Ryan Zinke to the effect 
that, “[T]he drilling plan was part of ‘a new path for energy dominance in America[.]’”). 
59 See, e.g., Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, EPA Chief Scott Pruitt Tells Coal Miners He Will Repeal 
Power Plant Rule Tuesday: “The War on Coal Is Over,” Wash. Post, Oct. 9, 2017 (describing EPA 
Administrator’s denunciation of Obama-era coal policies in the course of announcing reversal of Clean 
Power Plan);    
60 See, e.g., David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Donald Trump’s Racism: The Definitive List, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 15, 2018 (detailing President Trump’s long history of making racist appeals); Ta-Nehisi 
Coates, The First White President, The Atlantic, Oct. 2017 (arguing that Trump’s racial appeal, directed 
against Barack Obama’s presidency, constitutes a new expression of white nationalism in U.S. politics). 
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ranchers and laborers that Trump invoked in his national monuments declaration and the 
coal miners who joined Environmental Protection Agency Director Scott Pruitt when he 
traveled to Hazard, Kentucky, the traditional heart of Appalachian coal mining, to announce 
the withdrawal of the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan.61 
  
B. Public-Lands Populism: What and Who It Is 
Public-lands populism combines its substantive priorities for use of federal lands with 
a dissenting constitutional account of authority over those lands and, in some cases, a 
racialized picture of the relevant “public.” These themes link populist agitation across 
decades and topical flashpoints as well as counties and states, providing a flexible but 
unifying set of tropes for anti-federal and anti-regulatory politics.62 
 
1. The Ideological Orientation of Public-Lands Populism 
Public-lands populism’s adherents frequently voice a constitutional and historical 
narrative about Western public lands: Congress ought to have privatized these lands or 
turned them over to the states, as it did with Eastern and Midwestern acreage.63 Its failure to 
do so is not just dereliction, but usurpation: the Constitution’s Property Clause authorizes 
only “rules and regulations” governing the disposal of federal lands, not their permanent 
retention and management.64 Permanent federal land requires the consent of the state in 
which the land is set and federal purchase of that land.65 All federal public land, then - nearly 
seventy percent of Utah, for instance - represents an illegal form of domestic colonialism, in 
which lands and resources that should be controlled by state governments and local residents 
are instead ruled from Washington, subjecting local resource users to unaccountable 
bureaucratic oversight and relative poverty in a rich terrain.66 These arguments for the 
constitutional illegitimacy and historical injustice of federal reservations are aligned with 
accounts of the political and scientific illegitimacy of resource preservation. Denial of 
anthropogenic climate change is a recurrent theme in these networks, as is the view that 
                                                      
61 See supra n. __. 
62 In this description, I mean to emphasize that I am not describing merely a “protest” movement, and, 
indeed, that such an image implies a false picture. Protest of the kind I am describing here advances an 
alternative account of legality, and in that sense is jurisgenerative. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. 
Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 927 (2006) (describing the role 
of social movements in opening up settled points of interpretation in legal culture and bringing new, or 
old, commitments to previously settled debates); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term--
Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983) (exploring the “jurisgenerativity” of non-
legal actors, such as messianic religious communities and radicals of various stripes). 
63 See, e.g., Michael S. Coffman, Powerful Forces: More than a Century of Eastern Control of the West’s 
Natural Resources, Range Magazine, Fall 2016 at 16, 16-19 (“The U.S. cannot ‘own’ this land 
constitutionally, even though it claims it does. Upon entering the United States the new western states 
should have been given land not claimed by the settlers.”) 
64 See, e.g., Michael S. Coffman, Original Intent, Range Magazine, Summer 2016, at 14, 14-17 (so 
arguing). 
65 See id.  
66 See, e.g., Coffman, Powerful Forces, supra n. __ (“An incredible war between the federal government 
and western ranchers has been going on since 1891, mostly under the radar, pushed and funded by 
powerful northeastern progressive financiers and industrialists…. It has led to a very corrupt legal system 
that tragically has no fidelity to the restrictions imposed by the U.S. Constitution.”). 
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wild-lands preservation and non-motorized outdoor recreation are the pet agendas of small 
but wealthy coastal elites, which capture the political process to engineer “land-grabs” such 
as the controversial monument proclamations.67 While none of this constitution-in-exile 
theory appears in the official documents of the Trump Administration, it may exercise an 
gravitational tug, helping to account for denunciations of landscape-scale protection and of 
federal management of natural resources that some local interests would prefer to use 
differently. The more concrete commitments of public-lands populism, as we have seen, are 
front-and-center in the substance and rhetoric of the Administration’s monuments 
proclamations. 
 
2. The Networks of Public-Lands Populism 
This ideology connects lawmakers with lawbreakers in a circuit of dissent and 
affirmation. For instance, Ammon Bundy, the leader of the notorious 2016 occupation of the 
Malheur Wildlife Refuge in southeastern Oregon, recently joined elected San Juan County 
officials in a favored form of protest: riding all-terrain vehicles into areas of federal lands 
that land-management agencies have closed to motorized traffic, frequently while armed.68 
The state legislatures of both Utah and Nevada have passed resolutions endorsing the 
constitutional theories and land-management agendas of the movement, and Utah’s now-
retiring Senator Orrin Hatch has long been regarded as a protector at the federal level.69 It 
was San Juan county commissioner Calvin Black, not a militia member, who announced at 
a BLM hearing in 1979, “We had enough of you guys telling us what to do. I’m not a violent 
man, but I’m getting to the point where I’ll blow up bridges, ruins, and vehicles. We’re going 
to start a revolution. We’re going to get back our lands. We’re going to sabotage your 
vehicles. You had better start going out in twos and threes because we’re going to take care 
of you BLMers.”70 Black’s threats came amid the 1970s blooming of this ideology that is 
often called the Sagebrush Rebellion, which counted among its allies presidential candidate 
Ronald Ronald Reagan and his first-term Interior Secretary, James Watt.71 The Sagebrush 
Rebellion was the incubator for later resistance to monument proclamations, and was itself 
                                                      
67 Michael S. Coffman, Hope! Need Reform Could Be Coming to the EPA Swamp, Range Magazine, 
Summer 2017 at 10-12 (describing EPA as “probably the most corrupt agency in the federal government” 
and asserting that, although “Very few urbanites understand the depth of its corruption and list for more 
and more power that’s at the heart of the EPA…. President Trump does”); Coffman, Climate 
Racketeering, Range Magazine, Winter 2017 at 14, 15-16 (“hard empirical evidence strongly suggests 
that man’s use of fossil fuel has little to do with global warming”); Dave Skinner, Unforgettable, Range 
Magazine, Spring 2017 at 18, 19 (welcoming Trump’s election by recalling the Clinton Administration’s 
“post-Grand Staircase orgy of national monuments designations”);   
68 See Jonathan Thompson, A Reluctant Rebellion in the Utah Desert, High Country News, May 13, 2014 
(detailing Bundy involvement in motorized trespass protest and arrest of county commissioner). 
69 See Raymond Wheeler, War on the Colorado Plateau, High Country News at 16, 17-18 (Sept. 12, 
1988) (describing Utah Sen. Orrin Hatch’s patronage of the so-called Sagebrush Rebellion and see-
sawing of BLM land-use agendas between Carter and Reagan Administrations); [Resolutions on public 
lands]. 
70 See Raymond Wheeler, War on the Colorado Plateau, High Country News supra n. __at 17-18 (Sept. 
12, 1988) (reporting the April 12, 1979 statement of San Juan County Commissioner Calvin Black). 
71 See R. McGreggor Cawley, Federal Lands, Western Anger: The Sagebrush Rebellion and 
Environmental Politics 71-91 (1993) (tracing the origins and effects of the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 
mid-1970s and 1980s). 
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a recasting of a long-standing set of anti-regulatory themes that run back to the very 
beginning of federal withdrawals of public land.72 
 
 3. Which Public? Inclusion and Exclusion 
As with all localism, these claims involve not just assertions of the local against the 
national, but a bid by certain members of the local population to exercise legal control in the 
name of “the community,” often in the course of dominating or disregarding other locals.73 
(Regions and locales are imagined communities and products of political construction, as 
nations famously are.) While the surface dispute is between public-lands populists and 
recreational land users, a story that has often been described in terms of class and ethos, 
racial identity has also been a persistent feature of public-lands populism. This has been 
particularly clear around the Bears Ears monument. In the same month that President Trump 
invoked local control in announcing the monument’s shrinking, a federal district court ruled 
unconstitutional San Juan County’s longtime practice of packing voters from its Native 
American majority into one of three county commission districts, rendering those voters a 
permanent minority in a county government that has been a major platform for public-lands 
populism.74 One of the county commissioners now appealing the ruling was Ammon 
Bundy’s companion on ATV incursions into closed land, while six of seven local Navajo 
elected bodies endorsed the Obama monument.75 Range magazine, which is widely 
circulated in the region and a major vehicle of public-lands populism, has characterized the 
Bears Ears monument proclamation as a brew of “white billionaires, brown astroturf, [and] 
green monuments,” and describes Utah Dine Bikeyah, a Native organization involved in the 
monument’s planning, as a “`brown’ Astroturf front for the usual handful of major, multi-
billion-dollar Green foundations.”76 The restriction of Navajo representation in county 
government and the denial that pro-monument Native American voices are more than 
conservationists’ catspaws chime with a more material erasure: in the early Sagebrush era, 
the first major act of political trespass by public-lands populists was the mechanical 
destruction of an entire wall of Native American pictographs. The question of whose land 
the public lands are gets figured in public-lands populism as an issue of scale--local people 
                                                      
72 See, e.g., 7 Cong. Rec. 1719-23, 1861-69 (1878) (Congressional attacks on Interior Secretary Carl 
Schurz’s early efforts to limit private commercial timbering on federal land); id. at 1722 (Statement of 
Sen. Blaine) (“I know of nothing in the world to parallel it except that great assertion in our immortal 
Declaration of Independence that the King of England ‘has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent 
hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.’”); id. (Statement of Sen. 
Teller) (“I claim that nothing is demanded by the people in the Territories now that has not been conceded 
to all settlers in the [previous] new Territories.”); id. at 1721 (Statement of Sen. Blaine) (“[T]he hardy 
pioneer who goes forth and bears the flag of civilization onward … shall have the air and the water and 
the wood….”). 
73 See, e.g., Muller, supra n. __ (discussion of exclusionary forms of appeal to political identity). 
74 See Julie Terkowitz, For Native Americans, a “Historic Moment” on the Path to the Power of the 
Ballot Box, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/us/native-american-voting-
rights.html.  
75 See Jonathan Thompson, A Reluctant Rebellion in the Utah Desert, High Country News, May 13, 2014 
(detailing Bundy involvement in motorized trespass protest and arrest of county commissioner). 
76 See Dave Skinner, Monumental Megabucks, Range Magazine, Winter 2017, at 48-50. Range claims a 
readership of 170,000 half of them Western farmers or ranchers. See Jennifer Percy, Fear of the Federal 
Government in the Ranchlands of Oregon, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2018. 
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versus the national “People.” In practice, however, it turns out to be just as much a dispute 
over the composition of “the public” in public lands--who is treated as a normative member 
of the political community, and on what grounds. 
 
This is where public-lands populism connects most squarely with Trumpist white 
nationalism. The concern to de-legitimate the Native American presence in the West 
interacts with other threads of that nationalism: Range has interrupted critiques of monument 
designations to warn against “a Hispanic Advisor” of John McCain’s, who allegedly 
advocated a “sovereignty-surrendering” opening of borders to “a free flow of people.”77 
Cliven Bundy, Ammon Bundy’s father and an iconic figure in public-lands populism, has 
said of African-Americans, “I’ve often wondered, are they better off as slaves, picking 
cotton?”78 Shortly before the Bundy-led occupation of the Malheur Wildlife Refuge in 
southeastern Oregon, one of his fellow occupiers posted a video of himself burning pages of 
the Koran wrapped in bacon.79 Closing a loop with the first post-FLPMA attacks on 
preserved public lands in southern Utah, which involved defacing indigenous artifacts, the 
Malheur occupiers turned a Native American archaeological site into a latrine.80 The 
ambition to define the “public” in public lands in very racially specific ways infuses this 
politics, even though it is often sub-text in the insistence on extractive and other masculine 
activities and vested property claims that conjure up the settler-colonial history of public-
lands law.  
 
 C. Contending with Public-Lands Populism 
 How, if at all, should courts engage the role of public-lands populism and Trumpist 
nationalism in the challenged monuments proclamations? David Strauss suggests in a recent 
essay that judges might appropriately take account of discriminatory motives outside the 
usual evidentiary ambit of a case when they suspect they are confronting an Administration 
that is engaged in “[a]n attack on liberal democratic norms.”81 Strauss offers the example of 
recent decisions taking account of President Trump’s anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric in 
assessing his “travel ban” and suggests that, in light of the Administration’s illiberal posture, 
judges’ seeking to “push the limits of the law” can be “[i]n a deep way … a lawful thing to 
do.”82 I feel the appeal of the thought that on some combination of constitutional and policy 
grounds a court might decide against the President’s asserted power to revise or revoke 
monuments, rather than facilitate decisions that seem aimed at heating up culture wars in 
racially inflected ways. I am also wary of the difficulty in generating an administrable 
standard for this goal that could get very far in evaluating public-lands decisions. In any 
event, the effort is not necessary because another way is open. More conventional resources 
in public-lands law help to show the invalidity of the public-lands populist claim. To put 
these to use, however, we first have to excavate them. 
                                                      
77 See Tim Findley, Dust Devils, Range Magazine, Summer 2008, at 31, 37 (“sovereignty-surrendering” is 
the author’s phrase, “free flow …” the phrase he attributes to McCain’s staffer. 
78 See Adam Hochschild, Bang for the Buck, N.Y. Rev. of Books at 4, 6 (April 5, 2018). 
79 See id. at 8. 
80 See id. 
81 David Strauss, Law and the Slow-Motion Emergency, in Can It Happen Here? 363, 365 (Cass Sunstein, 
ed., 2018) 
82 Id. at 366. 




III. INTERPRETING THE ANTIQUITIES ACT ON THE TERRAIN OF PUBLIC-LANDS LAW 
On their face, all the major arguments now in play for and against the Trump 
proclamations have some plausibility. The text of the Antiquities Act can support the view 
that it withholds the power of monument revision or revocation from the President, and also 
the view that it implicitly grants that power. The early decades of Presidential practice under 
the Act seem to support a power of revision, but that practice was never tested in court, and 
stands in some tension with the Attorney General’s 1938 opinion denying any Presidential 
power to revoke monuments. Both the preservationist goals of the Antiquities Act and the 
general policy of FLPMA, which concentrates power to reclassify lands in Congress, may 
weigh against the President’s claim of a unilateral policy to strip protection from 
monuments. Neither of these arguments, however, clearly carries the day. 
 
One can get a great deal more traction on the question by locating it within the larger 
landscape of public-lands law. In this Part, I first briefly rehearse the arguments as others 
have developed them, then turn to developing an account of public-lands law as the 
interpretive frame for the question. 
 
A. Text versus History: For and Against the Trump Proclamations  
The straightforward case that the President may not revoke or substantially revise earlier 
monument proclamations rests on the text of the act itself. The Antiquities Act authorizes 
the President to “declare” national monuments, but makes no mention of revising or 
revoking earlier monument proclamations.83  The first premise of textual interpretation is 
that a statute should be read to say only what it says, and no more. On this account, the 
Antiquities Act confers only the power it names: a one-way power to withdraw and reserve 
public lands, but no power to reverse those actions. On this account, the Trump 
proclamations are lawless usurpation. 
 
Textualist interpretation seeks to enforce rule-of-law values of predictability and 
accountability by inhibiting (“preventing” seems optimistic) judges and other interpreters 
from inventing convenient commands to implement and reading them into statutes. This 
posture invites use of certain interpretive razors, signally expressio unius, the presumption 
that a statute’s stating one thing implies its exclusion of things not stated. The textual 
argument against the Trump proclamations is that the Antiquities Act does not do what it 
does not say. 
 
But what does it say? What meaning is fairly attributable to a statute that confers a 
power without reference to its potential obverse? The expressio unius canon has not 
produced a rule of statutory construction to the effect that a grant of power is one-way unless 
a power of reversal is explicit. Examples to the contrary are ordinary enough that Yoo and 
Gaziano propose the opposite: a “general principle … that the authority to execute a 
discretionary government power usually includes the power to revoke it--unless the original 
grant expressly limits the power of revocation.”84 Their examples mainly concern 
constitutional powers--Congress’s power to repeal a statute, the President’s power to remove 
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a discretionary appointee--as well as the power of agencies to withdraw previously issued 
regulations.85  It is commonsensical to suggest, as they do, that government could not go on 
if today’s officials were generally bound by the actions of their predecessors (or their own 
earlier acts), either as a bare functional matter or as a matter of legitimacy as new public 
attitudes and elections put new tasks on the agenda of government and remove others. They 
give no reason to think, however, that these considerations should produce a uniform rule of 
interpretation for all congressional grants of power to the President. 
 
The textualist strategy takes support from both predictability and democratic legitimacy 
inasmuch as its advocates can say in good faith, “Congress knew how to grant the President 
a power to revoke or revise monuments, and it didn’t do so here.”86 In this case, that claim 
has historical weight. The Antiquities Act’s silence on the reversal of monument 
proclamations is in contrast to two major contemporaneous public-lands statutes. The Forest 
Service Organic Act of 1897, which authorized the President to create national forests on 
federal lands and also “reduce the area … or … vacate altogether any order creating such 
reserve.”87 The 1897 Organic Act revised an 1891 authorization of the President to reserve 
national forests that lacked any reference to revision or revocation. Representative John 
Lacey, who would become the sponsor and architect of the Antiquities Act, argued in floor 
debate that the Organic Act’s revocation power was necessary because the 1891 act gave the 
President “power to create a reserve, but no power to restrict or annul it, and there ought to 
be such authority vested in the President.”88 Similarly, the General Withdrawal Act of 1910, 
passed in response to a request from President Taft to clarify his power in this respect, 
authorized the President to withdraw federal land temporarily from privatization for public 
purposes, and stated that such a withdrawal would remain in effect until either the President 
or Congress revoked it.   
 
Apart from the argument that grants of power should be presumed to include the powers 
of revocation and revision, the case for the legality of the Trump Administration’s 
proclamations rests mainly on presidential practice in the decades after the Antiquities Act 
was enacted. Orders shrinking monuments went unchallenged in the early and middle 
decades of the twentieth century. Most dramatically, President Wilson in 1915 cut 313,280 
acres from President Roosevelt’s 639,200-acre Mount Olympus monument.89 President 
Truman cut 4,700 acres from Santa Rosa Island National Monument, which had been 
established at just over twice that size by President Franklin Roosevelt, and President 
Eisenhower cut 8,920 acres from the Great Sand Dune National Monument.90 Smaller 
                                                      
85 [cite] 
86 [E.g., …] 
87 Sundry Appropriations Act of 1897, Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 36. 
88 29 Cong. Rec. 2677 (1897) (Statement of Rep. Lacey). 
89 Proclamation of May 11, 1915, 39 Stat. 1726 (transferring portions of Mount Olympus National 
Monument to management as national forest). 
90 Proclamation of August 13, 1945 (No. 2659) (finding that the lands removed from the monument were 
“now needed for by the War Department for military purposes” and that their elimination from the 
monument “would not seriously interfere with its administration”); Proclamation of June 7, 1956 (No. 
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monuments revision were often to accommodate conflicting private claims under then-extant 
homesteading laws, and no substantial presidential reduction took place between 1956 and 
2017. 
 
I’ll return later to the details and importance of these early Presidential revisions, as they 
do reveal something important about the operation of the Antiquities Act in its first fifty 
years--to wit, the larger terrain of public-lands law where it had its effect. These revisions, 
it turns out, do not provide the vindication for the Trump proclamations that the 
Administration’s supporters claim once they are understood in the context of their time and 
purposes. 
 
B. Locating the Antiquities Act Question Within Public-Lands Law 
The main limitation of all these arguments, on both sides of the dispute over the Trump 
proclamations, is that they proceed with little attention to the distinctive character of public-
lands law. Arguments of general principle or context-free precedent look very different when 
placed within this important and theoretically neglected field of public law. Public-lands law 
displays a structured normative pluralism. It integrates a range of competing values: 
privatization and extraction; motorized recreation and hunting; scenic preservation, hiking, 
and solitude; and ecological preservation and biodiversity. Public-lands law is substantially 
structured by centuries of statutes, adopted between 1785 and 1976, and the key to 
understanding a hard question today lies in the way the various statutes have integrated these 
goals into a single regime. 
 
 1. Public-Lands Law’s Eras, Constituencies, and Ideologies 
Public-lands law has developed through a series of distinct eras, each of which generated 
distinctive statutory regimes. Many of these regimes persist today in a kind of statutory 
palimpsest. Between 1785 and the last three decades of the nineteenth century, the overriding 
agenda of the field was privatization in service of economic (and political) development.91 
Statutes made public lands available for sale, as grants to railroad companies, and to 
individual settlers in return for homesteading, timbering, timber-planting, mining, draining 
wetlands, irrigating drylands, and, generally, domesticating the terrain and extracting 
commodities from it.92 Although President Franklin Roosevelt closed most public lands to 
homesteading by executive order in 1934 and Congress in FLPMA repealed the remaining 
homesteading statutes and other regimes for disbursing federal acreage as real estate, mining, 
drilling, and timbering maintain a major presence for extractive privatization on the public 
                                                      
preservation of the great sand dunes and additional features of scenic, scientific, and educational 
interest”). 
91 See Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (1968) (rich history of the political 
processes and interests at play in the disbursement of the U.S. public domain); James Willard Hurst, Law 
and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (1964) 
(setting out in detail the extraction of wealth from public lands that powered nineteenth-century economic 
development).  
92 See, e.g., General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. sec. 22 (2006) (“[A]ll valuable mineral deposits in 
lands belonging to the United States… shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands 
in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States….”). 
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lands.93 Grazing rights and motorized public access also persist as legal survivals from the 
period of development-oriented public-lands law.94 
 
Beginning in 1872 with the congressional creation of Yosemite National Park, a second 
mode of public-lands law entered the field: permanent reservation of land under federal 
management to serve one or another version of public interest.95 (Previous development 
statutes had provided for federal retention of land for post offices and military sites, but these 
were adjunct to development-oriented privatization, not alternatives to it.) The first statute 
regularizing such reservation was an 1891 provision authorizing presidential reservation of 
timberlands, later repealed under pressure of controversy but replaced by the Forest Service 
Organic Act of 1897.96 
 
These permanent reservation statutes fell into two categories. Conservation statutes 
promoted the utilitarian management of resources that were thought to be vulnerable to 
wasteful private extraction. Federal management of timbering on the national forests remains 
the paradigm of a conservation regime. Preservation statutes removed land from the 
pressures of economic use in certain unique and irreplaceable locations. Acts creating 
national parks preserved land in the service of scenery and outdoor recreation. The 
Antiquities Act did the same in the service of “objects of historic and scientific interest.” 
 
Each of these strands or layers of public-lands law has distinctive constituencies. 
Extractive industries, their employees, and communities that identify culturally with them 
are core supporters of the regimes of privatization, often advocating significant expansion 
of extraction, sometimes proposing re-opening sale of public acreage as real estate.97 (For 
the first, one need think only of 2008 Republican vice-presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s 
“Drill, baby, drill!” or “Drill here, drill now!”) Topical advocacy groups such as the Sierra 
Club and the Wilderness Society played key roles in preserving the lands devoted to their 
aesthetic and recreational values, and remain the organized core of a constituency for wild 
lands.98  These constituencies are, of course, cross-cutting and dynamic. Environmentalists, 
although still sometimes criticized as unduly fixated on Hudson River School images of 
American terrain, frequently support preserving less obviously charismatic landscapes and 
dimensions of biodiversity, such as wetlands. Industries that stand to benefit from extractive 
                                                      
93 See Executive Order 6910, Withdrawal of Public Lands for Conservation (Nov. 26, 1934) (withdrawing 
lands from settlement in the Western states). 
94 See Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. sec. 315 et seq. (governing grazing on public lands); 
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 425 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(claims of public access arising under pre-FLPMA Revised Statute 2477 to be adjudicated by courts on 
common-law basis rather than initially decided by Bureau of Land Management and reviewed under 
administrative-law standards). 
95 See An Act to Establish a National Park Service, Pub. L. No. 64-238, 39 Stat. 535 (codified as amended 
at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1 (2006). 
96 See Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. sec. 551 
(2006). 
97 See Philip Shabecoff, Watt Announces Plan to Sell 5% of U.S. Lands, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1982. 
98 See Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature, 119 Yale L.J. 1122, 1145-73 (tracing certain of these 
developments) (2010).  
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privatization may prefer taking resources from public lands to holding the full liability of 
private ownership.99 
 
Advocacy of competing agendas for public lands has always been tied up with 
competing ideas of who forms “the public” in the first place, ideas that have linked 
hierarchies among people together with normative ideas about the natural world--what its 
value is and how humans should fit into it.100 The privatization agenda that formed the main 
body of the first century of public-lands law was deeply involved in the rationalization of 
the expropriation of indigenous lands and the expansion of Anglo-American claims on the 
continent. This rationalization, which was by turns theological, anthropological (specifically 
racist), and economic, turned on the ideas that the natural world was meant to be developed 
and that the proliferation of private ownership was the best way toward this goal.101 It was 
central to the ideological scaffolding of “Manifest Destiny” in the self-description of a 
settler-colonial national project.102 The move toward permanent retention of federal lands in 
new regimes such as national forests and parks was connected with the development of a 
strong national administrative state--and with the projection of that state abroad in imperial 
adventures that were defended as performing the humanitarian service of administratively 
rational development.103 The Wilderness Society and the broader constituency for scenic 
wild lands and strenuous, low-tech recreation contended that the opportunity to escape from 
“civilization” is a key public resource that saves a developed society from becoming “a 
cage”--and elevated an elite, mainly white and male outdoors culture as the specially eligible 
spokespersons of the natural world and its meaning.104 
 
 2. The Normative Structure of Public-Lands Law 
These compressed, abstract accounts of worldviews and constituencies are connected to 
the public lands in ways that are extensive and concrete. Public-lands law integrates these 
values through a system of statutes that are distinguished by their goals and governance 
regimes. Lands governed by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management under 
the National Forest Management Act and FLPMA are, in the parlance of the field, multiple-
use acreage, statutorily dedicated to diverse purposes that are frequently mutually 
incompatible on any one tract: “recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and 
                                                      
99 See, e.g., Philip O. Foss, Politics and Grass: The Administration of Grazing on the Public Domain 
(1960) (classic study of the public-choice dynamics of access to public lands) . 
100 See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, After Nature 31-45, 153-87 (on these themes). 
101 See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (endorsing subordination and eventual elimination 
of Native American land claims); Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the 
Frontier, 10-48, 121-60 (2005) (on the early colonial acceptance that Native Americans should hold 
certain property claims and the erosion of this belief); Lisa Ford, Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and 
Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836 at 13-29, 183-203 (2010) (describing parallel 
growth of natural-rights claims to settlement in two settler colonies). 
102 See, e.g., Purdy, After Nature at 70-95. 
103 See id. at 153-87 (tracing the connections among the conservationists’ conception of the natural world 
and imperatives for its management, the need for a strong administrative state, and the projection of U.S. 
imperial power abroad in a recasting of Manifest Destiny). 
104 See id. at 180-87 (on the racism of key figures in early wilderness thought). The “cage” comment is 
from Senator Frank Church of Idaho. See 107 Cong. Rec. 18,365 (1961). 
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fish, and natural scenic, scientific and historical values.”105 These goals are not exhaustive, 
and they are not organized by reference to any master-value such as economic value.106 
These pluralist regimes require what is in effect ongoing landscape-scale zoning in national 
forests and on BLM land, with very considerable agency discretion. A typical management 
area in one of these land categories encompasses tens or hundreds of thousands of acres and 
is governed by a comprehensive plan, produced by the Forest Service or Bureau of Land 
Management in consultation with community members and interest groups and updated 
periodically. Such a plan might dedicate a valley or forest to wilderness preservation, hiking, 
and camping; open other parts of a region to motorized access and hunting; and provide for 
timber sales or mineral leases in selected areas (likely including the areas open to motorized 
recreation). The competing uses are not formally mutually exclusive - it is quite ordinary 
that an established hiking trail might pass through areas that are grazed and periodically 
logged, for instance; but mineral extraction tends to exclude much outdoor recreation, 
wilderness management precludes motorized activity and extraction, and wildlife and 
watershed values are in perennial tension with any other uses more intensive than wilderness. 
 
 The statutory regimes governing lands set aside as national parks (each one by an act of 
Congress) require much less pluralistic integration. The National Parks Service Organic Act 
of 1916 directs the agency “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and 
the wild life [sic] therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and 
by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”107 
Most acts creating national parks simply hand them over to the parks regime: Glacier 
National Park (1910), for instance, is to be preserved in “a state of nature” with an eye to 
“the care and protection of the fish and game, ” while Grand Canyon National Park (1919) 
is dedicated to “the benefit and enjoyment of the people” in keeping with the terms of the 
intervening Organic Act.108 While parks administration involves complex and contentious 
issues of ecosystem management and conflicts between public access and preservation, these 
decisions operate within a far narrower range of potential uses than those governing 
multiple-use lands, and extractive uses are almost categorically off the table in parklands. A 
similarly focused set of purposes governs the National Wildlife Refuge system, much of it 
established by presidential withdrawal. Ecosystem management for habitat health and 
biodiversity is the touchstone of the system, which is chiefly managed by the National Fish 
and Wildlife Service, and permission for recreational and hunting access and right-of-ways 
is conditional on compatibility with these overriding goals.109 
 
 The most categorical of the public-lands statutes, the Wilderness Act dedicates about 
110 million acres to “solitude” and “primitive and unconfined … recreation” by mandating 
                                                      
105 43 U.S.C. sec. 1702(c) (FLPMA). See also National Forest Management Act (establishing “multiple 
use” goals of “in particular … outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish”; 16 U.S.C. 
528 (setting goals for national forest management of “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and 
wildlife and fish purposes” (Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960). 
106 See 43 U.S.C. sec. 17002(c) (land planning shall proceed “not necessarily [with reference] to the 
combination of uses that will give the greatest economic return or the greatest unit output”). 
107 16 U.S.C. sec. 1 et seq.  
108 Act of May 11, 1910 (S. 2777, Public L. No. 171); Act of Feb. 26, 1919 (S. 390, Public L. No. 277). 
109 See 16 U.S.C. 668. 
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the preservation of its “wilderness character.”110 Wilderness areas are designated by separate 
acts of Congress and are protected from motorized access, road construction, and permanent 
structures.111 While no single agency administers the federal wilderness system, and 
wilderness designations overlie prior designation as nation park or national forest, the 
Wilderness Act’s categorical requirements impose a uniform management regime on all 
lands that it governs.112 
 
 One can say, then, that along this spectrum the hyper-categorical Wilderness Act all but 
administers itself (not literally true, of course, but it imposes little need for administrative 
agencies to balance interests or choose among values), while the multiple-use statutes 
demand pervasive, ongoing, and very basic judgments of value across the acreage managed 
by the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management. Between the two poles, national 
parks and wildlife refuges lean substantially toward the categorical end of the spectrum, 
permitting and pragmatically requiring a variety of management decisions, but organizing 
these around overriding and all-but-exclusive values of preservation and public recreation. 
 
 C. The Stakes and Structure of Reclassifying Public Lands 
 Reclassifying acreage among these categories is a high-stakes affair. It brings 
constituencies into the decision-making process or excludes them, gives their goals priority 
(sometimes absolute priority) or throws them into the scrum with competing interests. As 
noted earlier, the weight of these concerns is evident in Secretary Zinke’s memorandum 
recommending shrinkage of Bears Ears and other monuments, and in President Trump’s 
remarks upon issuing his monument proclamations. Both concentrated on the way that 
establishing a monument excludes certain extractive and, frequently, recreational interests 
from the land’s governance procedures. Zinke expressly contrasted monument status with 
the multiple-use planning process typical of Bureau of Land Management governance, 
praising the latter for its inclusiveness and flexibility.113 The effect of the revisions that he 
recommended, and which the President adopted, was to return hundreds of thousands of 
acres to multiple-use planning. 
 
That decision, which can be parsed as expressing a simple statutory-interpretation 
judgment that the President’s Antiquities Act discretion includes both creation and revision 
of monuments, shows its radicalism when placed within the field of public-lands law. Certain 
patterns have emerged that lend coherence to field’s navigation of reclassifications, and the 
Trump proclamations defy them. 
 
1. Intergenerational Synthesis 
                                                      
110 16 U.S.C. 1332. 
111 See id. et seq. 
112 See 16 U.S.C sec. 1133(b)-(c) (governing use of wilderness areas across agencies); Wilderness Society 
v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 353 F.3d 151, en banc (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing the categorical 
requirements of the Wilderness Act, which override discretionary agency judgments, even those arguably 
consistent with “wilderness values”). 
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 One pattern forms a scheme of intergenerational synthesis that integrates earlier and 
later public-lands regimes.114 Setting land aside as indefinitely public (withdrawal when it 
is simply held as public, reservation when it is dedicated to a particular public purpose, such 
as a national forest or park) forecloses privatization prospectively.115 But withdrawal and 
reservation are also limited retrospectively by previous privatization. Where privatization 
statutes have created inholdings and other conflicting claims, withdrawal and reservation 
statutes have directed land-management agencies to accommodate these or to address them 
by purchase or exchange. These principles developed under homesteading-style regimes that 
privatized acreage as real estate, and have continued into the modern era of extractive 
privatization. The multiple-use land regimes embrace extractive privatization in the form of 
timber sales and oil and gas leases, directing planning agencies to integrate these goals with 
recreation and ecological preservation. When land is reclassified and brought under the more 
categorical regimes, such as those governing parks and wilderness, the exclusion of new 
privatization extends to extractive leases: although these designations generally 
accommodate existing extractive claims, they also preclude new ones.116 
 
Because the categorical reservation regimes thus entail exclusion of many uses and 
interests, reclassification into those regimes is particularly fraught and contested. Parks 
creation, wilderness designations, the assessment and maintenance of “wilderness study 
areas” (potential wilderness where FLPMA directs BLM to prevent degradation of 
“wilderness values” pending final designation or non-designation as wilderness), and 
monument proclamations all attract this intense political contestation. This is precisely the 
sort of ongoing political conflict that the Zinke memo and Trump proclamations take up as 
fuel for an extractivist, selectively localist, and racially inflected environmental politics. 
 
 2. Separation of Powers 
                                                      
114 Bruce Ackerman develops the idea of intergenerational synthesis among “moments” of constitutional 
lawmaking in 1 We the People: Foundations (characterizing, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut as a the 
product of integrating the libertarian commitments of the Bill of Rights with the New Deal’s 
empowerment of the social-administrative state), and William Eskridge and John Ferejohn treat the 
accumulated normative weight of statutes as “precedent” for the reorientation of fields of law to new 
purposes or balances among purposes in A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution (2010) 
224-53 (on changing models of family and interpersonal commitment). In using the term, I don’t mean to 
take on any highly specified account of legal change, authority, or interpretation, but to indicate that my 
account of public-lands law has affinities with these ways of achieving coherence across time and among 
multiple sources of law. While my account is less theorized, it is also more specific. The structured 
priorities among the eras, and their expression in separation of powers with respect to reclassification, 
make my account more determinate in its interpretive recommendations than their far-reaching 
hermeneutics. 
115 See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. sec. 1131 et seq. (withdrawing wilderness area from 
eligibility for extractive claims, subject to vested prior claims, and with partial, time-limited exception for 
mining claims); Act of March 1, 1872 (establishing Yellowstone National Park and “withdraw[ing] from 
settlement, occupancy, or sale” all of the designated acreage); 16 U.S.C. sec. 161 et seq. (establishing 
Glacier National Park, honoring established property rights under land laws, withdrawing park from 
subsequent claims, and establishing a system of exchanges of timber or other public lands for existing 
rights to consolidate park lands). 
116 See, e.g., sources in previous note, supra. 
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 The Trump proclamations are even more remarkable in light of the separation-of-
powers practice that forms the second pattern structuring public-lands law’s integration of 
competing purposes. Although the President over the twentieth century enjoyed a variety of 
pre-FLPMA powers to move multiple-use lands in and out of availability for one purpose of 
another, such as mineral leasing, stock-watering, and irrigation, and to sequester land for 
national-security purposes, Congress has never authorized the President to remove land 
unilaterally from a categorical regime and open it to extractive use under multiple-use 
management. The reason is not elusive: the categorical regimes serve preservationist goals, 
protecting historic, ecological, scenic, and recreational (wilderness) values that are marked 
by their vulnerability to substantially irreversible disruption. It takes only one row of derricks 
or copper-mining pit to spoil a Yosemite Valley, one road to destroy a wilderness area (in 
terms of both the aesthetic-cultural meaning of wilderness and the statutory requirements of 
the Wilderness Act), one ill-informed or opportunistic digging expedition to wreck an 
archaeological site. Opening such a site to extraction risks losing the option of preserving 
other values there. 
 
For these reasons, public-lands law has long been structured to avert precipitate 
executive privatization, especially of lands set aside categorically for preservationist 
purposes. Such privatization, whether in the traditional homesteading form or, more 
recently, through timber sales and mineral leases, is the likeliest way for reclassification to 
destroy vulnerable values and preclude later implementation of management regimes aimed 
at those. Where Congress has brought lands into a categorical regime, such as under the 
national parks or wilderness system, the President has no power to change that status. Even 
where the President has enjoyed implicit power to reclassify public lands, such as the 
Supreme Court found in Midwest Oil, this power has asymmetrically favored preservation 
over privatization. 
 
 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), which I discuss later 
in connection with its reassertion of the primacy of Congress in classifying public lands, also 
contains a major and paradigmatic example of the conjunction I am describing: the one-way 
ratchet of Presidential reclassification power, authorizing movement of lands into 
categorical and preservation-oriented regimes, but not out of those regimes into multiple-use 
classifications. FLPMA extends the potential for wilderness classification to Bureau of Land 
Management acreage, which had been omitted from the 1964 Wilderness Act. FLPMA 
directs the Interior Department to inventory BLM lands with “wilderness characteristics” 
and the President to convey to Congress a recommendation as to which of those lands should 
be permanently designated as wilderness.117 Once a tract has been identified by Interior as 
potential wilderness (whether or not the President recommends permanent designation), 
FLPMA directs BLM to manage it “so as not to impair the suitability … for preservation as 
wilderness, subject, however, to the continuation of existing mining uses and mineral leasing 
in the manner and degree in which the same was being conducted [at the time of FLPMA’s 
passage].”118 This management directive continues until Congress decides whether to 
designate the land permanently as wilderness or to release it into the general pool of multiple-
                                                      
117 See 43 U.S.C. sec. 1782(a). 
118 43 U.S.C. sec. 1782(c). 
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use BLM lands.119 In sum, Executive classification of the land as potential wilderness moves 
it into that category, subject to the core intergenerational-synthesis principle of honoring 
existing rights from prior privatization regimes. The Executive, however, has no power to 
move the same land back into multiple-use, and so into eligibility for new extractive and 
privatizing claims; only Congress can do that. 
 
3. The Antiquities Act in the Public-Lands Setting 
This distinction helps to make sense of the textual differences between the Antiquities 
Act, which does not grant the President express power to revoke or revise monument 
classifications, and the Forest Service Organic Act, which did grant that power for national-
forest reservations. For pro-Trump arguments favoring the power to revoke monuments to 
succeed, the difference between the Antiquities Act (making no reference to revocation) and 
the Forest Service Organic Act (granting an explicit power of revocation) must be immaterial 
to the statutes’ actual grant of power, with the Organic Act otiosely stating the obvious. 
There is, however, a difference between the statutes that accounts perfectly for the difference 
in drafting. Appreciating it means descending from the general theory of default powers to 
the more specific setting of public-land law at the turn of the twentieth century. National 
forests have always been designated for multiple-use management, and the decision to move 
them back into the default regime of public lands would not essentially change this status, 
as moving categorically designated lands into multiple-use management would do. The 
Organic Act is the paradigm of a conservation statute, one assigning the management of a 
class of resources to an expert-staffed government agency charged with administering it to 
serve the long-run interest of the public.120 It was passed in response to worry about 
exhaustion of economically essential resources, and presupposed that the executive branch 
would use a variety of techniques to balance timbering, long-term forest productivity, and 
management of watersheds that were dependent on headwaters forests for erosion and flood 
control and yearlong flows.121 The point was to allow private extractive activity on the public 
lands, under appropriate regulation. Executive discretion, appropriately informed by 
expertise and utilitarian purposes, was the core governance technique of the statute, 
replacing a regime of private “entry” onto timber lands that had produced wasteful, even 
disastrous over-harvesting.122 
 
The Antiquities Act, by contrast, was a preservation statute. Its purpose was to protect 
certain resources from extraction or other transformation by removing them categorically 
                                                      
119 See id. 
120 See Sundry Civil Appropriations Act of 1897, 30 Stat. 35 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. sec. 551 
(2006). (“Public forest reservations are established to protect and improve the forests for the purpose of 
securing a permanent supply of timber for the people and insuring conditions favorable to continuous 
water flow.”); Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 189-99 (2012) (discussion conservation statutes). 
121 See 21 Cong. Rec. 2537 (1890) (entering into the record a memorial from the American Forestry 
Association, urging adoption of interconnected regime for managing forests and watersheds); Dep’t of the 
Interior, Report of the Secretary of the Interior 14 (1891) (urging use of President’s timber-conservation 
power to conserve both forests and watersheds). 
122 See, e.g., Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development (1968); James Willard Hurst, Law 
and Economic Development, supra n.__. 
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from the public lands laws’ schemes of sale and privatization. The reason for this approach 
lay in the character of the objects that the Antiquities Act protected: they were valuable for 
their unique and irreplaceable qualities, rather than for their fungible and instrumental uses. 
The Antiquities Act of 1906 combined language from two earlier legislative proposals that 
had failed between 1900 and 1905. One comprised bills drafted and promoted by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Smithsonian Institution, 
respectively, which sought to preserve Native American relics, which had been devastated 
by development in the Midwest and, most saliently, were then being actively looted in the 
Southwest by settlers, tourists, and freelance scientific expeditions, some of the largest of 
which removed the artifacts (and human remains) from the country to stock European 
collections.123 The second legislative proposal, which came from the General Land Office 
in the Department of the Interior, would have authorized the President to create national 
parks to preserve “scenic beauty, natural wonders or curiosities [and] objects of scientific or 
historic interest.”124 In extending its scope to “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric 
structures” and “objects of historic or scientific interest,” the Antiquities Act adopted both 
strands of the preservationist program.125 
 
It is entirely consistent with the patterns of public-lands law that the Antiquities Act 
withheld the same revocation power that the Forest Service Act granted because of the 
distinct purposes and instruments of the two statutes. For the national forests, presidential 
reservation was delegated as a tool in a flexible scheme aimed at increasing the long-term 
benefit of a fungible resource by publicly managing the timing and terms of private 
extraction. For the national monuments, reservation served to put unique and irreplaceable 
objects outside the scheme of extraction and privatization.  
 
If courts now found that the Antiquities Act authorized the President unilaterally to 
reclassify monument lands, they would have identified (or created) an anomalous power that 
cuts against the patterned logic of the rest of the public-lands regime, authorizing the 
President to un-make national monuments as he may not national parks or wilderness areas. 
The silence of the Antiquities Act on presidential power to revise or revoke monuments is 
not simply a standard case of Congress’s having known how to grant a power and declining, 
through silence, to do so; it is a case of Congress’s having acted consistently with a well-
justified and consistent pattern of not authorizing unilateral presidential de-classifications of 
categorically protected lands. 
 
  
4. The Antiquities Act and Public-lands Populism 
The pattern of powers in public-lands law generally casts light on the legal significance 
of public-lands populism. The movement that President Trump has embraced is engaged in 
an effort to recast the priorities of public-lands law, reviving an emphasis on extraction and 
privatization and increasing local control of (or devolving) federal acreage. Although this 
effort is rooted in a rejection of the authoritative account of the Property clause in favor of a 
constitution-in-exile view that last had much traction before the Civil War, it also implies 
                                                      
123 See Ronald F. Lee, The Antiquities Act of 1906 29-38, 47-51 (1970).  
124 Id. at 52-53.  
125 Supra n.__. 
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rejection of more proximate legal arrangements: substantively, the existing classifications of 
public lands, and, procedurally, the division between Congress and the President in the 
power to reclassify lands in favor of extractive privatization. As long as Congressional veto-
gates and time constraints impede legislative reclassification, the hydraulic movement of 
pressure for reclassification to the President is predictable. The attraction for an autocratic 
President with an ear for hot-button and racially inflected cultural disputes is obvious. 
 
This point deepens and textures the reasons courts should not rule that the Antiquities 
Act confers an anomalous Presidential power to revise or revoke monument status.126 The 
substance and procedure of public-lands law as now constituted represents a compromise 
among competing visions of the public lands and their users, in which extraction, 
privatization, and other kinds of populist access have been well represented. To the extent 
that one can separate extractive and other populist interests from their uglier valences, they 
are legitimate contenders for the use of public lands; but they are contenders whose loss and 
checking on key points is enshrined in the compromise that public-lands law composes. 
There is no reason to authorize this Administration to rewrite that compromise by doing 
what Presidents cannot otherwise do. It is possible, and straightforwardly appropriate, to 
neutralize this political gambit of public-lands populism by reading the Antiquities Act in 
consistency with both its text and the larger structure of public-lands law. 
 
IV. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION GOALS OF PUBLIC-LANDS LAW 
The asymmetric presumption against presidential privatization is partly rooted in the 
terms in which I have been discussing it: as a feature of the integration management regimes 
tailored to competing and often incompatible purposes. It is also rooted in concerns about 
corruption, both historically and in ways that the current Administration’s conduct makes 
salient. The concern with corruption had particular weight in eras when public-lands law 
was essentially a wealth-disbursement regime that created private property out of the public 
domain. Favoritism and other forms of corruption were concerns of obvious salience in a 
disbursement regime, but somewhat receded as twentieth-century public-land law eliminated 
traditional real-estate-conferring privatization and consolidated its hierarchy of management 
regimes. For some reasons that are specific to the minerals-releasing opportunism of the 
Trump monument proclamations and others that are general to the Trump Administration’s 
blend of public and private power in influence-peddling and favor-giving, the corruption 
                                                      
126 One might object that there is also anomaly in the Antiquities Act’s authorization of unilateral 
preservation, especially of landscape-scale monuments. I don’t deny that. The Act is interesting and 
politically controversial because it lodges an unusual power in the President. It is certainly convenient to 
environmentalists, among whom I tend to count myself, if the Act delegates an anomalous one-way 
reclassification power, rather than an anomalous reversible power. But two major points weigh against 
this objection. First, as I argue throughout this paper, the power to preserve and the power to privatize are 
not symmetric in public-lands law. A unilateral power of privatization would be anomalous in a different 
degree than the President’s Antiquities Act power of preservation, and would cut against organizing 
patterns and principles in the field. Second, the fact that the President’s preservative power under the 
Antiquities Act has the broad scope that the Supreme Court has recognized in Cameron and Cappaert is a 
given legal baseline for the purposes of this analysis. I am not seeking a first-principles account of public-
lands law, but engaging the legally open question now before the courts, whether the President’s power to 
proclaim monuments is reversible, in light of the normative patterns of the field.  
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rubric is once again salient, and the anti-corruption rationale for the presumption against 
presidential privatization is worth recovering. 
 
Corruption has gained fresh prominence in jurisprudence and legal scholarship in the 
past decade. The Supreme Court thrust it to the center of First Amendment law by holding 
in 2010 that only preventing “corruption or the appearance of corruption” could justify 
restrictions on campaign spending (and that “quid pro quo” transactions are the only sort of 
political influence-peddling that qualifies as corruption).127 Some scholars argued in 
response that the Court’s individualist, person-to-person conception of corruption should be 
complemented by a structural conception emphasizing institutional patterns of access and 
influence.128 Suits against President Trump under the long-dormant Emoluments Clause 
recently sparked another fire.129 It is too early to say confidently whether Emoluments 
Clause litigation will prove more than a kind of courtroom theater to highlight the current 
administration’s flouting of norms around the mixing of public and private influence, 
business, and wealth.130 Whatever its outcome, the emoluments dispute highlights a critical 
issue in legal design: restriction on Executive discretion, and specifically on Presidential 
discretion, can serve as a structural anti-corruption device by removing the instruments of 
favoritism and self-dealing. This principle has direct application to the interpretation of the 
Antiquities Act. 
 
The Antiquities Act’s asymmetric grant of presidential power to confer protection but 
not to remove it makes perfect sense when withholding of the removal power is recognized 
as being, in part, a structural prophylaxis against corrupt executive action. While the simplest 
reason not to give the President removal power is that he does not need it to accomplish the 
Act’s purpose of preservation, this is buttressed by the danger of misusing the power to 
undercut the preservation goal. 
 
 Several interlocking considerations support this interpretation. First, in 1906 reformers 
had agitated for decades against opportunistic privatization of public and land and its 
resources, focusing on executive-branch officials’ complicity in privatization that, while 
often not technically illegal, amounted to wealth-grabs from the public domain. Second, the 
Antiquities Act itself was intended to prevent opportunistic privatization in the form of 
expropriation of artifacts or destruction by development of irreplaceable sites. Third, 
landmark interpretations of presidential power over the public lands, including the major 
twentieth-century Attorney General’s account of the Antiquities Act, have recognized the 
                                                      
127 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
128 See, Zephyr Teachout, Corruption in America (2014); [Lessig; cf. Post] Others, more sympathetic to 
the Court’s situation if not always to its conclusion, insisted on the difficulty of devising a standard of 
structural corruption that could approximate judicial neutrality toward partisan and other electoral 
conflicts. Deborah Hellman, Post, Tribe. 
129 See David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan O’Connell, Federal Judge Appears Receptive to Emoluments 
Lawsuit Against Trump, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 2018 (describing suit by District of Columbia and 
Maryland); cf. Josh Gerstein, Judge Dismisses Suits Claiming Trump Violated Emoluments Clause, 
Politico, Dec. 21, 2017 (describing dismissal on standing grounds of an earlier suit). 
130 See, e.g., Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die (2018) (detailing Trump 
Administration’s norms violations around corruption and other topics). 
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following asymmetry: The presidential power to protect land in order avert destructive or 
opportunistic privatization does not imply presidential discretion to privatize public 
resources. Taken together, these considerations support an interpretation of the Antiquities 
Act as in part a structural anti-corruption device, designed to protect irreplaceable public 
resources by enabling the President to prevent their privatization, but not to privatize them 
himself. These considerations are particularly relevant in considering unprecedented 
monument revisions by a President whose private economic interests and loyalties are 
entangled with public power in ways that are historically unique in their opacity and ethical 
dubiousness.131  
 
A. The Concern with Corruption in Public-Lands Law 
Public-lands corruption was a point of fixation for public debate in much of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and was particularly salient when the Antiquities 
Act was debated and passed. The federal privatization of North American land, timber, and 
minerals is one of the great disbursements of wealth in world history, and it is hardly 
surprising that it prompted fierce conflict over the question who should get the resources and 
the various forms of legerdemain that grew up around every privatization scheme. To give 
a sense of the scale of the matter: an 1886 House report found that fraudulent claims and 
illegal fencing of Western grazing lands had brought more than 21 million acres under the 
control of British and European cattle capital, including 1.75 million acres in the hands of 
the memorably titled Marquis of Tweeddale.132 A reformist commissioner of the General 
Land Office (GLO) reported in the mid-1880s that some forty percent of homesteading 
claims were fraudulent but tolerated by the office; “conspicuously fraudulent” claims under 
the Timber Culture Act had been protected by official rulings of his predecessors; and false 
claims and open looting of public timber were “universal, flagrant, and limitless.”133 The 
conflict was not chiefly between privatizing claimants and federal regulators, though 
congressional critics of the reformist administrators often painted it in these populist 
terms.134 It was, rather, a matter of the General Land Office’s tolerating or collaborating with 
large extractive investors’ manipulation of privatization statutes. So the reformist GLO of 
the 1880s returned tens of millions of acres to eligibility for “entry” under statutes governing 
homesteading and other small-scale settlement after determining that railroads had locked 
them up by abusing the vast grants that were meant to finance their westward expansion.135 
The GLO’s commissioner emphasized that Executive-branch discretion had been the key to 
                                                      
131 [Pro Publica & others] 
132 See House Reports, 49t Cong., 1st sess. (Serial No. 2445), vol. XI, 3455, p. 2. Cf. Paul W. Gates, 
History of Public Land Law Development 483, n. 58 (1968) (suggesting the report was somewhat 
sensationalistic but pointed to a real phenomenon; even an exaggerated documentation highlights the 
intensity of political sentiment around the issue). 
133 See Gates, supra n. __ at 459 (summarizing report of General Land Office Commissioner William A.J. 
Sparks). 
134 [citation] 
135 See Gates at 460. As Gates notes, the open class-and-faction battles over railroad grants included 
incidents such as the following in 1860s Kansas: “raids on the railroad offices, destruction of all the 
equipment of surveying parties, public whipping of the officers  … burning of ties, and the gutting of the 
office of a newspaper subsidized by the railroad. Two men who bought land from the railroad were 
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a use of the office’s power “to the advantage of speculation and monopoly, private and 
corporate rather than the public interest.”136 
 
The same issues remained highly salient during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency, 
when the Antiquities Act became law. Roosevelt remarked in his 1902 State of the Union 
address on the widespread abuse of public-lands laws, and appointed an investigatory 
commission that found the great majority of land claims in regions rich in timber or minerals 
were made by catspaws with no intention of using them, then transferred to speculators or 
extractive interests.137 Roosevelt warned that “ample notice has now been given to the 
trespassers, and all the resources that the command of the Government wlll hereafter be used 
to put a stop to such trespassing.”138 
 
Reformers were keenly focused in these decades on corruption in the disbursement 
of public lands and what measures might prevent it.139 In its 1905 report, the Public Lands 
Commission described extensive opportunistic privatization.  Under the Timber and Stone 
Act, “many of these [claims] were made by nonresidents … who could not use the land nor 
the timber on it … and it is apparent that they will eventually follow the course taken by 
many similar entries and become part of some large timber holding.”140 The commission 
found that a privatization-for-hire system had developed: “poor men” filed lands claims, 
which they transferred to timber companies, receiving only hourly wages for the time spent 
on paperwork, resulting in “the sale of the lands far below their real value.141 Thus, “timber 
lands which should have been preserved for the use of the people are withdrawn from such 
use” in favor of corporate profit-taking.142 The commission found that the Homestead Act 
had been “perverted” by a similar claims-for-hire system in which ostensible settlers (often 
women or, in the Northern Rockies and Pacific Northwest, transient Canadians) flipped their 
claims to speculators.143 Similar transfers were frequent under the Desert-Land Law.144 In 
sum, the public-land laws had become vehicles for “the shrewd business man who aims to 
acquire large properties,” and the majority of privatization served “speculators and 
corporations.”145  
 
Executive-branch corruption was integral to the commission’s account of the problem. 
The Public Lands Commission Report concluded, “Almost without exception collusion or 
evasion of the spirit of the land laws was involved” in the privatization it criticized.146 For 
                                                      
136 Gates at 471 (quoting General Land Office Commissioner Sparks). Sparks wrote of GLO officers, “if 
they do not corruptly connive at fraudulent entries, [they nonetheless do] modify their instructions and 
exceed their discretionary powers in examinations of final proof.” Land Office Report of 1885 at 50. 
137 See Gates at 487-92; Roosevelt, Annual Report to Congress (1902). 
138 Roosevelt, Annual Report, supra n. __. 
139 Elting E. Morison, 4 The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt 1217-18 (1951). 
140 Use and Abuse of America’s Natural Resources: Report of the Public Lands Commission at vi, 58th 
Cong. (3d Sess.), Doc. No. 189(1905). 
141 Id. at xvi. 
142 Id. at xvi - xvii. 
143 Id. at xvii - xviii. 
144 Id. at xviii-xx]. 
145 Id. at xxiii. 
146 Id. at xxiv. 
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example, abuses of the Homestead Act were frequently facilitated by federal land officials 
who doubled as principals in loan companies, who lent the capital to ease each stage of the 
claims-and-transfers system that they oversaw, “eager first to induce settlement and then to 
make these loans on account of the double commissions received.”147 The commission’s 
recommendations were chiefly structural changes to public-lands laws to inhibit these 
opportunistic transactions by restricting hasty transfers of claimed land and blocking the 
extension of the Homestead Act to mountainous regions rich in timber, stone, and minerals, 
but with little prospect for genuine 160-acre farming settlements in the Midwestern mold.148 
 
B. The Anti-Looting Motives of the Antiquities Act’s Adoption 
 It was in this reformist ferment around the public-lands laws that the Antiquities Act 
was adopted. The problem to which the Act responded was an aspect of a general and long-
running crisis that was then regarded as having entered an acute phase: the looting of the 
public lands by various forms of corrupt or opportunistic privatization. The 1904 Senate 
Committee hearings on a predecessor bill focused on a legacy that was “being obliterated 
every day” by “commercial speculators and excavators.”149 Artifacts were leaving the West 
in “carloads” every day during the seasons that permitted excavation.150 Some of the losses 
were due to commercial “[v]andals,” others to archaeological expeditions launched by 
European institutions, which had exported “hundreds of car loads of objects which should 
have been preserved, as far as possible, in the condition in which they are found, or at least 
have been retained in this country.”151 With the general public lands open to anyone to enter 
and remove artifacts as they saw fit, the law effectively invited these forms of commercial 
looting and willy-nilly export. 
 
 The country’s scientific community was mobilized around a perceived crisis of 
historical looting. Both the Smithsonian Institution and the American Archaeological 
Association were closely involved in advocacy and legislative drafting to meet the 
emergency, which they aptly expected to intensify as excavators hurried their efforts in 
anticipation of regulation.152 There was little comfort in the thought that artifacts might end 
up in the hands of museums and collectors, because their greatest value as public goods was 
as a source of knowledge about pre-history, which required their systematic study in their 
original location.153 
                                                      
147 Id. at xviii. 
148 See id., passim. 
149 Preservation of Historic and Prehistoric Ruins, Etc., Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Public Lands, April. 28, 1904, at 5. 
150 Id. at 5.  
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152 See generally, Lee, supra n. __; Preservation, supra n. __ (containing extensive congressional 
testimony by Francis W. Kelsey, secretary of the Archaeological Institute of America, and statements 
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The Antiquities Act is part of a family of reforms intended to secure the public interest 
in federal lands by raising barriers to opportunistic and corrupt privatization that undercut 
that interest. Understanding its origin and purpose casts light on the way the presidential 
public-lands power it creates has been interpreted in the past: as an asymmetric power to 
preserve public lands and their resources from certain kinds of privatization, but not to 
reclassify those lands so as to make them newly available for privatization. The asymmetry 
is a structural measure to prevent the forms of executive “collusion” with rent-seekers that 
privatization statutes had long invited. 
 
C. Anti-Corruption in Prior Interpretation 
1. The Attorney Generals’ Opinions as Anti-Corruption Reasoning 
Concern over corruption and opportunistic privatization was ambient among reformers 
and provided the major motive for the Antiquities Act. This would have been the self-evident 
theme of any initiative to reserve public lands from privatization during this period, even 
had the motive not been explicit in advocacy for the Antiquities Act. The same concern 
emerged as an important feature of the interpretation of the Executive power to reclassify 
public lands. The concern to check corruption structurally found expression in a persistent 
asymmetry, in authoritative discussions of the President’s public-lands power, between the 
use of presidential power to preserve public lands, and uses of presidential power to tailor 
or expand privatization and extraction. 
 
In 1938, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Attorney General Homer Cummings to 
assess a proposal to abolish a small national monument altogether. Cummings concluded 
that the President lacked the power to do so.154 Cummings assumed the legality of the earlier 
presidential reductions in monument size, describing them as implementing the Act’s 
requirement that monuments be “confined to the smallest area compatible” with protecting 
their objects.155 In denying that the President may outright de-classify a monument, he 
contrasted the Antiquities Act with the Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, which (as noted 
earlier) “expressly provides that the President at any time may modify any Executive order 
establishing any forest reserve by reducing its area or by vacating it altogether.”156 In 
Cummings’s reasoning, the absence of an express congressional grant of revocation power 
in the President implied that Congress had granted the President only a one-way power of 
classification: Once the President had classified a site as a monument, “the power conferred 
by the act was exhausted.”157 
 
In that last phrase, Cummings quoted his predecessor Edward Bates, who had written a 
Civil War-era Attorney General’s opinion finding that President Lincoln lacked power to 
make available for privatization a site reserved under statute by earlier presidential action.  
In his opinion, Bates argued that presidential power to reserve federal land should be 
                                                      
154 See Proposed Abolishment of Castle Pinckney National Monument, 39 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 185 
(1938). 
155 Id. at 188. 
156 Id.; [cite Forest Service Organic Act]. Cummings also distinguished the General Withdrawal Act, 
which authorized temporary presidential withdrawals, reversible by executive action. 
157 39 Op. Atty. Gen. at 187 (quoting Rock Island Military Reservation, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 359 (1862)). 
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interpreted as one-way rather than reversible to prevent corruption.158 Bates’s opinion 
addressed the question whether the Secretary of War could release an unused fort to the 
Treasury Department for disposal under federal preemption law (a species of nineteenth-
century federal land-privatization that gave priority to the claims of settlers in actual 
possession of public land by enabling them to “preempt” other claims), where the fort had 
been established by presidential proclamation under congressional authorization.159 
Elaborating on his already-quoted conclusion that the President’s “power … was exhausted” 
upon reserving the land, and did not extend to revoking the reservation, Bates argued that 
discretionary revocation would invite executive branch officials to “enrich some speculating 
favorite” who could qualify to claim the land as a settler.160 In other words, once lands had 
been removed from privatization schemes, the danger of their being selectively re-classified 
to favor the patrons or proteges of the executive branch provided a strong reason not to read 
Congressional delegation as authorizing such re-classification. 
 
This concern would apply with special force to lands that had been developed at federal 
expense, as the fort at Rock Island had been. It would also apply with special force to land 
that had been reserved because of its unique and irreplaceable qualities. Either would be 
susceptible to ill-motivated discretionary privatization, and in both cases the loss from such 
corruption would be particularly high. There is, then, a snug fit between the basis of the 
drafting difference between the Antiquities Act and the Forest Service Act and the reasoning 
behind the Executive Branch’s long-running opinion that national monument declarations 
are irrevocable. 
 
2 Midwest Oil as an Anti-Corruption Opinion 
United States v. Midwest Oil is the Supreme Court’s most important treatment of 
Presidential power over public lands.161 In the course of affirming implied executive power 
to reclassify federal land, it notes the asymmetric presumption against privatization and ties 
it to anti-corruption concerns. 
 
In September of 1909, the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey reported to the 
Secretary of the Interior that, amid a crowded oil rush, California’s oil lands would soon be 
fully privatized under the Oil Placer Act of 1897.162 The Director expressed concern that the 
privatization of oil lands would leave the Navy “obliged to repurchase the very oil” the 
federal government was then disbursing.163 On the Secretary’s recommendation, and in 
anticipation of Congressional legislation, President Taft then issued a proclamation of 
“temporary withdrawal,” removing more than three million acres in California and 
Wyoming from eligibility for Placer Act claims.164 Oil operators who filed claim thereafter 
on a portion of the affected lands then sued the United States, asserting that Taft lacked 
power to withdraw the lands without explicit Congressional authorization and in the teeth of 
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an extant statute giving private parties the right to claim oil lands. The Court held that the 
President had the power to withdraw the lands from oil claims.165 The power might not 
inhere in the office “as an original question,” but a long practice of Congress’s accepting 
Presidential withdrawal for bird reserves, military reservations, and ancillary support of the 
latter (such as hay, water, timber, and target ranges) implied that the President could 
withdraw lands “as agent” of Congress and acting “in the public interest.”166  
 
After marshaling instances of unchallenged presidential withdrawal, Justice Lamar 
turned to make clear that, “These decisions do not, of course, mean that private rights could 
be created by an officer withdrawing for a railroad more than had been authorized by 
Congress in the land grant act.”167 The distinction here is between withdrawing land for 
purposes of preserving it and, on the other hand, withdrawing it to create private rights. The 
latter class of action is effectively irreversible. It forecloses Congress’s future options in 
exercising its ultimate power over public lands. It is also especially susceptible to corruption, 
as it offers the President the opportunity to disburse economic assets from the public lands 
to favored industries and entities. Both concerns apply to reclassification of monuments that 
opens them to mining, drilling, and logging. Both, moreover, distinguish such 
reclassification from the initial monument proclamation, which preserves the resources in 
public hands for any future contravening (or confirmatory) congressional decision and does 
not create any private economic claim on the land. 
 
D. The Asymmetric Premise Against Presidential Privatization 
Anti-corruption concerns, then, form a second and complementary basis of the 
asymmetric premise against Presidential privatization. Reclassifying protected lands as 
eligible for privatizing extraction presents a set of interlocking dangers. Given the nature of 
the values generally protected in categorically preserved land, such as historic and scientific 
interest and ecological health, extraction may irremediably compromise those values, 
effectively denying Congress the option to preserve them in the future. Given the structure 
of intergenerational synthesis in public-lands law, creating private claims also burdens 
subsequent Congressional decisions to preserve lands even where it does not substantively 
undercut eligibility for preservation. Before 1934, when homesteading effectively ended, 
and 1976, when Congress repealed the last of the homesteading statutes, privatization of the 
land itself was the primary concern of this form. Today, the concern is not that the Executive 
will literally sell land out from under Congress, but rather that private rights to mining, oil 
leasing, and other extraction, once issued, will burden subsequent management options. 
 
These by-now familiar reasons for the presumption against privatization find 
reinforcement in the threat of corruption: the Executive’s capacity to act quickly and 
decisively, the basis of many functionalist assertions of Presidential powers, has the 
downside risk that a subordinate official--or the President--may opportunistically disburse 
private rights in public lands. Both Executive interpretation of Congressional delegations of 
power (including the Antiquities Act itself) and the Court’s interpretation of the President’s 
implied power have taken account of this danger through the structural anti-corruption 
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device of a presumption in favor of a one-way Presidential power of reclassification, toward 
greater protection, but not toward greater eligibility for private claims. The same reasons 
support a conclusion that the President’s power of proclamation under the Antiquities Act is 
a power to protect but not a power to remove protection. The prospect of mines and derricks 




V. MONUMENT REVISIONS AND THE ERAS OF PUBLIC-LANDS POWERS 
 What, then, to make of the presidential revisions of monument proclamations in the first 
fifty years of the Antiquities Act’s operation? To see these clearly, one must set them in the 
context of the withdrawal and reservation powers’ migration between Congress and the 
President over the twentieth century. The Antiquities Act has operated against a changing 
backdrop of inter-branch allocation of power over the public lands, and this backdrop is 
highly relevant to interpreting the significance of historical congressional and executive-
branch practice. While the allocation of power has always recognized the presumption 
against Presidential privatization, the early revisions took place against a background of 
expansive claims of Presidential power to reclassify federal land. That claimed power 
accounts for the plausibility of the early revisions in their times. It is, however, no longer 
part of public-lands law, having been repealed in FLPMA’s sweeping 1976 consolidation of 
reclassification power in Congress. Presidents in the early days of the Antiquities Act had 
reason to think they could reclassify monuments in most such cases regardless of whether 
the Act delegated that power. That is very different from the question since 1976, which 
homes in entirely on the Act’s delegation, and its consistency with the presumption against 
Presidential privatization. 
 
 A. Early Presidential Revisions 
Early presidential monument revisions were mostly boundary adjustments, modest in 
absolute acreage terms (although they sometimes represented a substantial percentage of 
small, site-specific monuments). In some cases, the revisions made corrections to initial 
proclamations that had relied on hastily gathered or incomplete information about the 
character of the protected objects and their setting in the surrounding site.168 In other cases, 
revisions accommodated pre-existing private land claims that fell within or were impeded 
by the monument.169 Such accommodation is characteristic of all federal land-reservations 
schemes; even the sweepingly anti-development Wilderness Act acknowledges existing 
property rights.170 Federal land agencies are typically authorized to seek acreage-swaps with 
private or state-government landholders to consolidated preserved federal land without 
                                                      
168 See, e.g. Presidential Proclamation No. 873, 36 Stat. 2491 (1909) (Proclamation of President Taft, 
initially setting aside Navajo National Monument); Presidential Proclamation No. 1186, 37 Stat. 1733 
(1912) (revising boundaries of same); Presidential Proclamation No. 2681, 11 Fed. Reg. 2623 (1946) 
(Proclamation of President Truman, reducing size of monument by more than 1,800 acres of an initial 
46,034 because of errors in initial survey). 
169 See, e.g., 37 Stat. 1737 (1912) (Taft) & 45 Stat. 2984 (1929) (Coolidge) (each modifying Mount 
Olympus National Monument to exclude a preexisting homestead); Exec. Order 3897 (Sept. 5, 1923) 
(excluding land from the Katmai National Monument to accommodate a prior mining claim). 
170 See notes __ infra and accompanying text. 
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eliminating vested existing rights. Many early revisions simply carried out this policy. A 
handful of revisions facilitated road-building in the monument or its vicinity, a management 
measure consistent with then-current practices in managing national parks and other lands 
preserved for scenery and recreation. None of these revisions displaced the basic judgments 
of earlier presidential proclamations as to the purpose or scale of preservation. 
 
Several of the most substantial presidential monument revisions pursued national 
security interests in wartime - either formally declared or openly anticipated after major 
attacks on U.S. assets. In 1915, Woodrow Wilson removed 311,280 acres from Mount 
Olympus National Monument, transferring them to the Olympic National Forest.171 The 
order came on May 11, four days after a German submarine sank the British ocean liner 
Lusitania, killing near 1,200 people, including 128 Americans. As John Ruple has noted in 
a survey of early presidential revisions, the Olympic Peninsula was a key U.S. source of 
Douglas fir for ships and Sitka spruce for airplanes, and the U.S. soon dispatched the “Spruce 
Production Division” of the Army to the Olympic National Forest to contribute to timbering 
and build railroads for shipping trees to sawmills.172 In March of 1945, President Truman 
removed 4,700 acres from the Santa Rosa National Monument in Florida to expand an 
airfield that had become an important training and testing site for the Army Air Force.173 
President Eisenhower’s 1951 reduction of Glacier Bay National Monument acknowledged 
a secret, presidentially authorized airfield that had been built within the monument during 
World War Two.174 As I’ll explain in more detail later, these reductions need not have rested 
on an Antiquities Act delegation of power to shrink monuments. They might well be seen as 
exercising an implied presidential power to reclassify lands for national-security purposes, 
which the Supreme Court recognized in 1915’s United States v. Midwest Oil, and which 
Congress explicitly eliminated when it passed FLPMA in 1976.175 
 
The most substantial monument revision to fall outside these interpretations is 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s 1940 removal of nearly 72,000 acres, or about 26% of the 
total area, from the second Grand Canyon National Monument, which President Hoover had 
proclaimed in 1932.176 Roosevelt had earlier vetoed a bill to shrink the monument 
differently, and there was widespread perception that the monument should be adjusted to 
exclude certain private inholdings; but Roosevelt’s action unmistakably assumed 
presidential power to shrink a monument upon reconsideration of the fit between its purposes 
and its boundaries, and on a considerably larger scale than in earlier and smaller adjustments 
to accommodate private property. Although it does not constitute a pattern of Congressional 
acquiescence to an interpretation of the Antiquities Act that delegates to the executive a 
power of revision or revocation, it stands as an important precedent of presidential 
monument revision without repudiation by Congress. 
 
 B. The Zenith of Presidential Withdrawal and Reservation Power 
                                                      
171 Proclamation of President Wilson, 39 Stat. 1726 (1915).  
172 [early Ruple draft, on file with author] 
173 Proclamation No. 2659, 59 Stat. 877 (1945). 
174 Proclamation No. 3089, 20 Fed. Reg. 2103 (1951). 
175 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
176 54 Stat. 2692 (1940); Proclamation No. 2022 (1932). 
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 The Antiquities Act was adopted in a period of aggressive but contested Presidential 
withdrawal and reservation. President Theodore Roosevelt in 1903 began a practice of 
unilaterally declaring “bird reservations” that set aside habitat. The fifty-one reservations 
that he had created by the end of his second term in 1909 formed the basis of the National 
Wildlife Refuge System, which now encompasses more than 150 million acres of land and 
water.177 These unauthorized presidential reservations overrode congressional privatization 
statutes that created private rights of entry and acquisition on public lands.178 Although 
Congressional acquiescence to these reservations formed an important part of the basis of 
the Supreme Court’s finding of an implied Presidential reservation power in Midwest Oil, 
no statute formally delegated the power to create them.179 The custom for decades was that 
proclamations of wildlife refuges either declared a new refuge without reference to any basis 
of the power or simply invoked “the authority vested in me as President of the United 
States.”180 As we shall soon see, much turned on the scope of the latter power, which the 
Roosevelt Administration in particular asserted as the basis of its public-lands decisions. 
 
 Despite its boldness in creating wildlife refuges, Theodore Roosevelt’s Administration 
did not move to create national monuments without explicit Congressional authorization. 
The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but almost certainly included the general 
impression, evident in the legislative history and subsequent administration of the 
Antiquities Act, that monuments resembled national parks, which had always been 
congressional creations.181 They likely also included awareness of Congressional skepticism 
of sweeping Presidential reservations, even in multiple-use categories such as national 
forests, which did not limit privatization as sharply as monuments declarations did. Although 
the President in 1906 had enjoyed unilateral power to create national forests for most of two 
decades under congressional acts of 1891 and 1897, Congress forbade future unilateral 
national forest designations in 1908, spurring a midnight session in which Theodore 
Roosevelt and his chief forester, Gifford Pinchot, reserved tens of millions of acres the night 
before Roosevelt signed the bill.182 
 
 Congress passed the General Withdrawals Act (Pickett Act) of 1910 with the ostensible 
aim of clarifying the scope of Presidential power in this area; the effect, however, proved to 
be quite the opposite. Congress acted at the behest of President Taft, who sought clarification 
                                                      
177 [RSS 149] 
178 See Midwest Oil at 469 (referring to the many cases in which “the Executive, by a special order, has 
withdrawn lands which Congress, by general statute, has thrown open to acquisition by citizens”). It was 
for this reason that three justices dissented from the Court’s opinion, led by Justice Day. [Contrast the 
Steel Seizure Cases & note how strong a presidential assertion of power was embraced here.] 
179 See Charles F. Wheatley, Study of Withdrawals and Reservations of Public Domain Lands 244-45 
(1969) (for the Public Land Law Review Commission). 
180 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 4851 (establishing Upper Klamath Wildlife Refuge) (Pres. Coolidge, Apr. 3, 
1928) (“it is hereby ordered that the unappropriated public lands … are hereby reserved and set apart … 
as a refuge and breeding ground for birds and wild animals”); Exec. Order No. 6924 (establishing Lake 
Mattamuskeet Wildlife Refuge) (Pres. Roosevelt, 1934) (reserving lands “by virtue of and pursuant to the 
authority vested in me as President”). 
181 [Legislatively entwined with proposals to permit the President to create parks, and administratively 
treated afterward as resembling parks.] 
182 [historical citation] 
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on the extent of Presidential power following his controversial 1909 withdrawal of oil-
producing lands from mineral-leasing programs.183 The resulting legislation authorized the 
President “temporarily [to] withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the 
public lands” and to “reserve the same for … public purposes to be specified in the orders 
of withdrawal.”184 Debate ensued over whether the Pickett Act had simply affirmed a power 
of temporary withdrawal that operated in parallel with whatever other powers the President 
might hold over public lands, or instead represented an exhaustive account of the President’s 
power in the field, precluding subsequent withdrawal or reservation except on its express 
authorization or that of another statute.185 
 
 This question came to a fine point in a clash of legal and bureaucratic giants within 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Administration. The Pickett Act required that lands withdrawn under 
its authority remain open to hard-rock mining, and President Roosevelt sought to withdraw 
public lands in Oregon from the operation of the mining laws as well as other extraction 
regimes. Attorney General Robert Jackson, asked to assess the legality of the proposed 
action, initially concluded that the Pickett Act was intended to occupy the field and thus 
excluded any further implied or inherent power--which would have to provide the basis of 
the proposed mining withdrawal, as such withdrawal had no statutory foundation.186 Besides 
citing legislative history suggesting that the Pickett Act was intended to “clearly define the 
extent of [withdrawal] authority,” Jackson argued, “If … the President [had] an unrestricted, 
inherent power to withdraw lands from the public domain for public purposes, he could 
avoid, in every instance, the restrictions upon his statutory power by simply ignoring the 
withdrawal statute and acting upon his non-statutory, inherent power.”187 Such a power, 
Jackson contended, would make the withdrawal and reservations statutes of public-lands law 
merely advisory, a strange result for a field of law founded on the Property Clause’s grant 
of power over the public lands to Congress. 
 
From the Department of the Interior, Harold Ickes shot back, “The President in the 
exercise of his presumed inherent general withdrawal power has issued approximately 268 
Executive orders of withdrawal since 1910 …. It is imperative that lands set apart for 
national defense and other purposes should be subject to the exclusive use and jurisdiction 
of the Federal Government.”188 Henry Stimson, the Secretary of War, chimed in, warning of 
“inconvenience and embarrassment” if lands withdrawn for military purposes were subject 
to private mining claims, and Thomas Emerson, a legal anchor of the New Deal who would 
go on to argue Griswold v. Connecticut and teach for three decades at Yale Law School, 
wrote a special memorandum from within the Attorney General’s office, arguing against 
Jackson’s conclusion.189 At first Jackson stood his ground, reiterating his earlier arguments 
                                                      
183 Wheatley at … 
184 Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (repealed 1976). 
185 Wheatley at … 
186 Letter of Attorney General Robert Jackson to the Secretary of the Interior, July 25, 1940. 
187 Id. at 4 (emphasis original). 
188 Letter of Interior Secretary Harold Ickes to the Attorney General, Feb. 13, 1941, at 4-5. 
189  Letter of Henry Stimson, Dec. 21, 1940; Memorandum of Thomas Emerson to Charles Fahy, Asst. 
Solicitor General, May 9, 1941 (arguing that the Pickett Act, in referring only to “temporary” 
withdrawals, left undiminished an executive power to make permanent withdrawals from and reservations 
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in reply to Ickes.190 On June 4, 1941, under intense pressure, he reversed his position and 
submitted an official opinion agreeing with Ickes and Emerson that the Pickett Act left 
undisturbed a distinct Presidential power to reserve public lands permanently.191 It is not 
clear whether Jackson changed his mind or only his position: he submitted his own earlier 
letter alongside his final opinion, noting in a cover memorandum that “the question is 
important and may be said to be close.”192 In the final opinion, Jackson recited, then 
repudiated, his former view that the President’s asserted general power of permanent 
withdrawal would leave no purpose for lesser statutory delegations of withdrawal power; 
but he did not refute it, instead blandly noting that the President could choose to exercise a 
lesser, statutory power if he saw fit.193 At other points, the final opinion simply adopts 
portions of Thomas Emerson’s earlier text.194 Eight days after the opinion, on June 12, 1941, 
President Roosevelt nominated Jackson to the Supreme Court, and he took the oath of office 
on July 11, less than a month after his nomination.195 
 
 Six months and a week after Jackson reversed his opinion and adopted the Ickes-
Emerson line, the country was at war, and any concern with the niceties of Presidential 
control over public lands was eclipsed. From then until the adoption of FLPMA in 1976, the 
official view of the Executive Branch was that the President (and by delegation the Secretary 
of the Interior) could withdraw or reserve lands permanently for public purposes.196 Indeed, 
it seems to have been the position of most of the Executive Branch, emphatically including 
Ickes’s Interior Department, well before Jackson came around to it. As Charles Wheatley 
judges in his comprehensive assessment of the withdrawal power before FLPMA, “At least 
from 1934, it appears to be the practice of the Executive in making … withdrawals which 
are not specifically requested by statute, but are made in his discretion, to cite both the Pickett 
Act and the President’s general inherent authority as the legal basis for the withdrawal.”197 
Wheatley noted that the Pickett Act was itself generally treated as authorizing indefinite 
withdrawals, “temporary” only in the sense that they were subject to later revocation by 
Congress or the President, so the “inherent” authority was coextensive with it except where 
                                                      
of the federal public lands). See also Glenn Fowler, Thomas I. Emerson, 83, Scholar Who Molded Civil 
Liberties Law, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1991 (obituary of Thomas Emerson). 
190 Letter of Attorney General Robert Jackson, April 11, 1941. 
191 See 40 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 73 (U.S.A.G.) (June 4, 1941). 
192 Memorandum of Attorney General Robert Jackson, June 4, 1941. 
193 See 40 Op. Atty. Gen. 73 at 81. 
194 See id. at 83 (adopting portions of Emerson’s memorandum of May 9, 1941 concern the “practical 
results” of constraint on the executive branch that might follow from a contrary opinion). 
195 I am aware of no evidence that Jackson’s nomination was conditioned on his concession of the 
withdrawal power issue. As I indicate in the body text, however, it does seem to me that Jackson regarded 
himself as more nearly outvoted than out-argued. Ickes clearly wanted this general withdrawal power, and 
outflanked Jackson bureaucratically to ensure that it became executive-branch policy in a time when 
Roosevelt enjoyed substantial congressional majorities and a rising concern with war soon eclipsed the 
finer points of public-lands powers. 
196 See E.O. 10,355, Fed. Reg. 4831 (May 26, 1952) (order of President Truman delegating to the Interior 
Secretary (“the authority vested in the President by [the Pickett Act] and the authority otherwise vested in 
him to withdraw or reserve lands … for public purposes, including the authority to modify or revoke 
withdrawals and reservations of such lands heretofore or hereafter made”).  
197 Wheatley at 126. 
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withdrawals extended to mining, in which case the inherent power was taken to kick in.198 
This “inherent” power was little theorized in its later uses, other than invocations of Midwest 
Oil and Executive practice. In the disputes leading up to Midwest Oil, it was generally 
formulated as a “stewardship” power in the President to protect the public lands on behalf 
of Congress, which had undisputed ultimate authority over them under the Property 
Clause.199 
 
This historical exposition sheds light on the substantial monument reductions of the first 
fifty years of the Antiquities Act. Never tested in court, they took place in a legal landscape 
in which specific statutory authorizations of withdrawal and reservation coexisted with a 
widely accepted Presidential power to accomplish the same on other, imprecisely 
unspecified grounds. There was little clear difference, if any, between what the President 
might do under the Antiquities Act and what he might do through the latter implied power; 
as we have seen, Attorney General Jackson thought there was none, and that this was 
evidence of the trouble with the Administration’s theory of Presidential powers. If Jackson’s 
analysis of the implied-powers question were correct, then the Grand Canyon reduction was 
part of a general program of maximizing the President’s discretion over public lands, and 
not necessarily a reliable guide to interpreting the statute. In either case, the main point is 
that Roosevelt’s capacity to put the stamp of legality on his Grand Canyon reduction was 
overdetermined by a legal landscape in which the President successfully asserted a robust 
set of powers for reclassifying public lands. 
 
 Nonetheless, even the most aggressive account of Presidential discretion in public-lands 
reclassification featured the asymmetric preference for preservative decisions: the whole 
purpose of the President’s power was to hold open Congress’s options for ultimate 
disposition of the land. This is consistent with the Court’s analysis in Midwest Oil and, 
indeed, very nearly a consequence of the Property Clause’s assignment of public-lands 
power to Congress: the President’s power must be in service of Congress’s, either by 
delegation or by implied power of preservation. This asymmetry is consistent, too, with the 
preference for keeping resources in categorical preservation status once they are assigned to 
it that I described in Part III.C, above. In these respects, public-lands law is consistent across 
its eras. 
 
 C. FLPMA’s Re-Consolidation of Congressional Power 
                                                      
198 See Wheatley at 128-29. 
199 See, e.g., 1 Dept. of the Interior Ann. Rep. 12 (1908) (“If there be no power to affirmatively provide 
for the ultimate use or disposition of the public domain in accordance with the need to the public welfare, 
it is the duty of the Executive to temporarily prevent its acquisition until Congress may have an 
opportunity to consider the question and adopt appropriate legislation…. [Such withdrawals over the 
country’s history] were purely the acts of stewards farsighted enough to foresee and protect the interests 
of their principal, the people of the United States.”); Brief for Appellant at 16-17, United States v. 
Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (“When … necessity and has not been anticipated by legislation … 
and … occurs at such a time and in such circumstances that it would be unwise and dangerous to defer 
action, the duty to set apart the required tracts (subject to the future disposal of Congress) devolves with 
all its weight upon the President.”). 
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 Within this basic consistency, public-lands law underwent a profound transformation 
with the adoption of FLPMA in 1976. The organic act for the Bureau of Land Management 
imposed a multiple-use planning system on lands administered by the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), which had previously operated under a patchwork of entry-and-
extraction statutes against a backdrop of substantially unrestricted public access.200  It 
expressly withdrew the implied delegation of power that the Court recognized in Midwest 
Oil, alongside twenty-nine statutory provisions for Executive withdrawal.201 The effect was 
to leave the Antiquities Act as the only basis for extensive Presidential reservation of public 
land (or extensive withdrawal outside certain procedures for the temporary withdrawal 
subject to close monitoring by Congress).202 The President’s discretionary withdrawal power 
under the Antiquities Act stands in vivid contrast to the limited and closely supervised 
FLPMA withdrawal power. With large and permanent presidential withdrawals channeled 
to the Antiquities Act, it is unsurprising that the decades since 1976 have seen millions of 
acres of land and hundreds of millions of oceans acres designated as national monuments. 
 
 Applying some familiar canons of construction strictly, Congress’s silence might 
suggest ratification of prior presidential practice and executive branch interpretation. This 
might imply approval of the previous Presidential monument revisions as based in proper 
interpretation of the Antiquities Act and of Attorney General Cummings’s opinion that the 
President cannot revoke a prior monument proclamation. Three considerations, however, 
suggest otherwise. 
 
First, the substantial monument reductions in the early decades of the Antiquities Act 
were at best problematically compatible with Cummings’s view that reductions were valid 
when in service of the “smallest area” requirement. As I have been arguing, they are better 
seen as having needed bolstering by the implied powers recognized in Midwest Oil. They 
need not be understood as having relied on the Antiquities Act. 
 
Second, although Congress in FLPMA did not amend the Antiquities Act, it very 
substantially changed the place of the Act’s delegation within the field of public-lands law, 
from a means of accomplishing something the President could do by multiple paths to a 
unique outcropping of unilateral Presidential power. (One might say that if the Antiquities 
Act were a geological feature on the metaphoric terrain of public-lands powers, after 
FLPMA it would, like certain buttes and sky islands, be eligible for its own protection.) 
 
Third, it is not clear that Congress did in fact intend in passing FLPMA to leave the 
Antiquities Act just as it had been. The House Committee’s Report on the bill claims, “It 
would … specifically reserve to the Congress the authority to modify and revoke 
                                                      
200 [cite to FLPMA planning sections; TGA, e.g.; the HCN description of people doing what they wanted 
before 1976; maybe Gates on this?] 
201 See Pub. L. No. 94-579, sec. 704(a) (1976) (“Effective on and after the date of approval of this Act, the 
implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from the acquiescence 
of the Congress (U.S. v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459) and the following statutes and parts of statutes 
are repealed….”). 
202 [Details of these in FLPMA] 
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withdrawals for national monuments created under the Antiquities Act[.].”203 The portion of 
the report refers to Section 204(j) of the bill as presented on the House floor, which reads as 
codified: “The Secretary [of the Interior] shall not … modify or revoke any withdrawal 
creating national monuments under [the Antiquities Act].”204 This is, on its face, a puzzling 
prohibition, as the Act had never contained an authorization to the Secretary to exercise any 
power under its terms. The Secretary had, however, enjoyed a delegation of Presidential 
withdrawal power since 1952 under the very broad terms of E.O. 10,335, which might have 
led to drafting confusion about whose power was at issue.205 
 
Section 204(j) might be read as either (1) acknowledging that the President could 
modify or revoke Antiquities Act reservations but denying that power to the Secretary 
despite E.O. 10,335; or (2) denying the Executive Branch the delegated power to modify or 
revoke monument proclamations, but under a mistaken apprehension of where in the 
Executive that power would be lodged if it existed. 206 It might also be (3) a ghost of the 
drafting process. The drafting of section 204(j) was contemporaneous with a version of the 
bill that would have transferred the power to create national monuments from the President 
to the Interior Secretary. The latter proposal was withdrawn in the face of objections from 
the Ford administration.207 
 
Whichever it is, FLPMA in the end let the Antiquities Act stand without amendment. 
But it did not leave the field unchanged. It wiped out a panoply of express and implied 
Presidential powers to reclassify public lands and left only its own temporary withdrawal 
procedure and the Antiquities Act. In post-FLPMA public-lands law, the survival of the 
Antiquities Act is anomalous, though it is plainly an intended anomaly. To interpret it as 
authorizing the President to strip the protected status of substantial monument lands would 
create a much greater anomaly, one cutting against the Congressional consolidation of power 
in FLPMA, the aversion to precipitate Executive privatization (with its invitation to 
corruption), and the principle that only Congressional action can remove lands from 
categorical protection once they enter it. 
                                                      
203 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1163, at 9 (May 15, 1976). 
204 43 U.S.C. 1714(j). It reads in full, “The Secretary shall not make, modify, or revoke any withdrawal 
created by an Act of Congress; make a withdrawal which can be made only by Act of Congress; modify 
or revoke any withdrawal creating national monuments under [the Antiquities Act]; or modify or revoke 
any withdrawal which added lands to the National Wildlife Refuge System prior to [FLPMA’s adoption] 
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205 See supra n. __. 
206 Professors Squillace, Biber, Bryner, and Hecht (henceforward Squillace et al.) argue that the reference 
to “the Secretary of the Interior” in sec. 1714(j) “may be a drafting error,” and that the text ought to have 
referred to the President, because “section 204(j) was intended to reserve to Congress the exclusive 
authority to modify or revoke national monuments.” Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas Bryner, & Sean 
Hecht, Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103 Va. L. Rev. 
Online 55, 60-61 (2017). 
207 See id. at 61-64. On the interpretation of Squillace et al., the reference in 204(j) to the Interior 
Secretary was originally paired with the later-withdrawn amendment to the Antiquities Act, and would 
have achieved a consistent policy of restricting revocations and modifications of land withdrawals to 
Congress except for those ordered under the process set out in FLPMA. 
 




D. Early Presidential Revisions in the Arc of Public-lands Law 
The Executive-branch precedents for substantial monument revision, then, date back to 
a time of far more expansive Presidential authority over the public lands. The powers 
asserted in that period were in some tension with the coherence of public-lands law overall. 
Soon-to-be Justice Jackson made a good case that they were incompatible with it, which was 
never really answered even though he abandoned it as a lost cause in bureaucratic infighting. 
Whatever their theoretical excesses, however, these powers were generally rationalized as 
Executive “stewardship” of Congress’s final authority over public-lands classification, and 
were asserted in exercises consistent with the premise against Presidential privatization. 
They account for the early, substantial Presidential revisions of national monuments in ways 
that make Antiquities Act authority nugatory for those. These powers are also consistent in 
the substance of their exercise, if not always in the Roosevelt Administration’s maximalist 
and inexact articulation, with the general structure of public-lands law. 
 
Interpreting the Antiquities Act’s delegation of power today--the first time it has been 
adjudicated--is an opportunity to fit its ambiguous text within the structure of post-1976 
public-lands law. Doing so is not simply a matter of choosing a present-oriented interpretive 
strategy over an originalist one or emphasizing the coherence of the field rather than 
concentrating on the text of the statute. Rather, the bare original text of the Antiquities Act 
is ambiguous on the scope of power to revise or revoke monument proclamations, and all 
but requires a larger picture of how public-lands governance should work to lend it meaning. 
Unchallenged Executive practice under the statute is good evidence on that issue; but, as we 
have seen, that practice was part of a legal era in which the Executive branch enjoyed a 
panoply of discretionary powers of reclassification, including key powers that were legally 
dubious but unchallenged in the politics of the era. Congress withdrew those powers in 1976, 
leaving the Antiquities Act the sole basis of unilateral Executive reclassification of public 
lands, and setting it within an overarching policy of Congressional primacy in public-lands 
classification.  
 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
 The Trump Administration presents a delicate question for legal analysis. On the one 
hand, blandly conventional legal analysis risks normalizing the Administration’s departure 
from basic liberal and procedural norms. On the other hand, legal analysis risks its distinctive 
status as professional reason if it sets itself a priori against an Administration. The goal here 
is to keep political and moral judgments in view while asking how distinctively legal 
concepts can help in grappling with the present moment. 
 
 In its monuments proclamations, the Trump Administration asserts a sweeping power 
to reclassify fifteen million acres of protected federal land and hundreds of millions of 
marine acres. The proclamations already issued, which purport to strip more than a million 
acres of monument status, are redolent of this Administration’s illiberal and procedurally 
dubious tendencies. They elevate to federal policy the themes and goals of a strand of 
Western populism that is tainted with outlawry and racism. The proclamations also cater to 
extractive industries, particularly uranium, oil and gas, and coal, in ways that resonate with 
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the Trump Administration’s relentless mixing of public wealth and private interest--in a 
phrase, its penchant for corruption. 
 
 The burden of my argument has been that legal analysis of the monuments 
proclamations can take account of these facts by showing how the proclamations fit within 
the larger and theoretically neglected terrain of public-lands law. Corruption is not a novel 
concern here. For well over a century, the field has been shaped by recognition that 
precipitate and opportunistic privatization is a perennial temptation in a body of law that 
governs nearly a third of the country’s acreage and a great deal of its natural wealth. The 
Executive branch’s capacity for rapid, unilateral, and obscure action makes it especially 
suited to this form of misappropriation. Recognition of these facts is built into public-lands 
law in the long-standing asymmetric preference for Presidential power to preserve lands over 
Presidential power to privatize them. That preference finds expression in statutory structure 
(e.g., the Pickett Act, FLPMA), jurisprudence (e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil), and 
executive-branch analysis (e.g., the opinions of Attorneys General Cummings and Bates). It 
also informs the larger pattern of powers in public-lands law. Understanding that pattern 
helps to show why the Antiquities Act would be sharply anomalous if it were read today as 
authorizing substantial and unilateral Presidential de-classification of monuments. The kind 
of opportunistic favoritism that the Trump proclamations display is precisely what public-
lands law has been structured over centuries to avert. These proclamations are paradigms of 
why unilateral Presidential reclassification toward privatizing natural resources would be 
anomalous in public-lands law. A Court would properly consider the anomaly in deciding 
whether the power to create national monuments should imply the power to unmake them. 
 
 In the case of the Trump proclamations, the question of opportunism and favoritism in 
reclassification decisions interacts with the influence of racially inflected nationalism and 
localist outlawry on the Administration’s priorities. Here too, as with corruption, these 
themes are not novel or alien to public-lands law. Extractivism, settler-colonialism, and the 
priority of property-style resource claims and local control are, in key ways, continuations 
of the themes that governed the first hundred years of public-lands law. Their constituencies 
have never left the field. It is partly because of these constituencies’ persistent opposition to 
preservation agendas that public-lands law has always been inflected by disputes over 
national identity, from the utilitarian nationalism of Gifford Pinchot and Theodore 
Roosevelt’s national forests to the national parks’ much-advertised status as the American 
answer to Europe’s cathedrals to the claim that wilderness preservation would keep the 
country from becoming a “cage.”208 
 
 Here too, public-lands law has been shaped by grappling with the themes that the Trump 
proclamations raise. And here too its shape contains a good part of an answer. The public-
lands populists’ claims on behalf of privatizing and extractive policies already have a 
specific legal expression that is deeply embedded in public-lands law: in long-standing 
public rights-of-way across the federal lands of the West, in mining and mineral-leasing 
regimes, in grazing rights, and in the default policy of extensive public recreational access-
-and, above all, in the private real estate that was substantially created under federal 
                                                      
208 See supra n. __. 
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privatization schemes.209 In other words, these claims do not come from outside public-lands 
law. They are part of it, and they occupy a specific place in its structure. Where they have 
been vested, they tend to persist within new regimes that otherwise emphasize preservation 
over extraction and economic use. On multiple-use lands, they play a prominent part in the 
statutorily mandated planning process. Where, however, they are not vested but take the 
form of inchoate expectations of continued access, they yield on categorically protected 
lands: new privatizing and extractive claims are almost uniformly excluded under 
preservation regimes. For such claims to get traction again, the lands themselves must be 
reclassified. That reclassification is generally reserved to Congress. If the Antiquities Act 
authorizes the President to hand a victory to public-lands populists by reclassifying hotly 
contested lands, then it is a dramatic anomaly in public-lands law. It would authorize 
constant perennial and shifting reopening of precisely the disputes that the field exists to 
structure and resolve, and through a mechanism that is procedurally orthogonal to the rest of 
the field. 
 
 The Trump proclamations raise a novel question for interpretation of one of the most 
important public-lands statutes. Like much that this Administration does, however, it is not 
so much new as it is an effort to reopen questions that many of us had hoped were closed. In 
this case, they should remain closed. Well-established principles in the structure of public-
lands law give good reason to judge that the President’s proclamations are ultra vires under 
the Antiquities Act. All that is necessary is to see them. 
 
   
  
  
   
 
                                                      
209 RS 2477 inter alia. 
